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THE ECONOMICS OF LIMITED 
LIABILITY: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF 
NEW YORK LAW FIRMS 
Scott Baker* 
Kimberly D. Krawiec** 
Since the rapid rise in organizational forms for business associa-
tions, academics and practitioners have sought to explain the choice 
of form rationale.  Each form contains its own set of default rules that 
inevitably get factored into this decision, including the extent to which 
each individual firm owner will be held personally liable for the col-
lective debts and obligations of the firm. 
The significance of the differences in these default rules contin-
ues to be debated.  Many commentators have advanced theories, most 
notably those based on unlimited liability, profit-sharing, and illiquid-
ity, asserting that the partnership form provides efficiency benefits 
that outweigh any costs.  In this article, the authors test these theories 
empirically by examining the choice of organizational form by New 
York law firms.  Although the evidence indicates a strong shift from 
the general partnership form to the limited liability partnership form, 
a significant number of New York law firms remain general partner-
ships. 
The authors conclude that the prevailing theories based on 
unlimited liability, profit-sharing, and illiquidity are insufficient and 
posit that, in contrast to the beliefs of many commentators, the choice 
of form decision is quite complex.  It depends on a variety of factors, 
including the behavior of other similarly situated firms that the deci-
sion makers consider competitors for prestige and clients.  Nonethe-
less, it is apparent that unlimited liability is generally considered bur-
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densome, and it is the authors’ prediction that, at some point in time, 
nearly all the firms in their sample will choose to file as limited liabil-
ity partnerships.  The general partnership form, with its unlimited li-
ability, will operate only as a penalty default that punishes parties 
who fail to sufficiently define their organization, forcing firm mem-
bers to reveal relevant information to courts and interested third par-
ties. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The choice of organizational form for business and professional ser-
vice firms has been of interest to lawyers and economists for years.  The 
law offers a menu of choices, including general partnerships (GPs), lim-
ited partnerships (LPs), limited liability partnerships (LLPs), limited li-
ability limited partnerships (LLLPs), limited liability companies (LLCs), 
and, of course, corporations.  Each organizational form has its own set of 
default rules, governing everything from the distribution of profits to dis-
solution.  Within each business form, parties can alter most of the default 
rules governing the arrangement. 
One of the most important of these default rules is the extent to 
which individual firm owners will be held personally liable for the collec-
tive debts and obligations of the firm.  GPs and corporations are consid-
ered polar opposites with respect to this default rule.  The corporate de-
fault rule is one of limited liability, meaning that, absent special 
circumstances, corporate shareholders are personally liable for corporate 
debts only up to the amount of their original investment in the corpora-
tion.1  General partners, by contrast, can be held personally liable for all 
unpaid partnership debts.2 
The significance of this difference in default rules, if any, has been 
hotly debated by legal academics for some time.3  In addition, both 
economists and legal scholars have debated the relative costs and bene-
fits of limited liability, with some observers arguing that the owners’ per-
 
 1. The exceptions to the general rule of shareholder limited liability are that shareholders will 
be personally liable:  (1) when the corporation is not properly formed; (2) for the amount of any un-
paid capital contributions that they have committed to make; and (3) when the veil of limited liability 
is pierced.  JEFFREY D. BAUMAN ET AL., CORPORATIONS LAW AND POLICY 318–63 (5th ed. 2003). 
 2. Unif. P’ship Act §§ 13–15 (1914), 6 U.L.A. (pt. I) (2001); Unif. P’ship Act §§ 304, 306 (1997), 
6 U.L.A. (pt. I) (2001). 
 3. Compare Roger E. Meiners et al., Piercing the Veil of Limited Liability, 4 DEL. J. CORP. L. 
351, 364 (1979) (arguing that the difference in the limited liability default rule between corporations 
and GPs is insignificant because the default rule can be altered through a variety of private mecha-
nisms), with, Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation, 52 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 89, 93 (1985) (arguing that “the distinctive aspects of the publicly held corporation—
delegation of management to a diverse group of agents and risk bearing by those who contribute capi-
tal—depend on an institution like limited liability”), and Henry Manne, Our Two Corporation Sys-
tems: Law and Economics, 53 VA. L. REV. 259 (1967) (arguing that the publicly held corporation could 
not exist without limited liability). 
KRAWIEC.DOC 6/20/2005  10:42 AM 
No. 1] THE ECONOMICS OF LIMITED LIABILITY 109 
sonal liability for the firm’s debts provides efficiency benefits that out-
weigh any costs.4 
In addition to the rule of full personal liability, many other partner-
ship default rules appear—at least at first glance—unattractive.  For ex-
ample, the GP default rules include:  the rule that profits and losses be 
split equally among the partners, the one partner/one vote rule, and the 
guarantee of a partner’s right to seek a buyout.5 
Despite these seemingly unattractive defaults, several theories have 
emerged regarding the desirability of the partnership form.  These theo-
ries can be divided into three broad categories:  (1) theories based on 
profit-sharing; (2) theories based on the illiquid nature of a partnership 
interest; and (3) theories based on the unlimited liability of the GP form.  
The first two categories of explanations apply to partnerships generally, 
whereas the third theory—unlimited liability—is a justification for the 
GP form, in particular. 
In contrast to the theories posed by economists and legal academics 
that assert the benefits of unlimited liability, practicing lawyers cite the 
high costs of unlimited liability and argue that, given recent innovations 
in organizational forms, no valid reasons exist for the formation of busi-
ness or professional enterprises in the GP form.6  In fact, some legal advi-
sors go so far as to assert that any lawyer who chooses to organize clients 
as a GP is committing malpractice.  If the practitioners are right, one 
must then question why the GP form exists at all. 
In the last fifteen years, all fifty states have passed laws that permit 
the formation of an LLP.7  To become an LLP, a general partnership 
need only file a form with the secretary of state, pay a nominal fee, and 
 
 4. See infra text accompanying notes 23–25. 
 5. Unif. P’ship Act § 401(b) (1997), 6 U.L.A. (pt. I) (2001) (default rule on profit and losses); 
Unif. P’ship Act § 401(f) (1997), 6 U.L.A. (pt. I) (2001) (default rule on management responsibilities); 
Unif. P’ship Act § 701(a) (1997), 6 U.L.A. (pt. I) (2001) (default rule on partner buyouts).  These de-
fault rules can be circumvented or ameliorated in several ways.  First, and most obviously, the parties 
can opt for another organizational regime, such as the LLC or corporation.  Second, the default rules 
other than limited liability can be altered through a detailed partnership agreement.  Finally, the rule 
of unlimited liability can be ameliorated through contract and insurance. 
 6. See, e.g., Lee Berton & Joann S. Lublin, Seeking Shelter: Partnership Structure Is Called in 
Question as Liability Risk Rises, WALL ST. J., June 10, 1992, at A1 (quoting Belverd Needles, former 
director of DePaul University’s School of Accounting as stating, “With such risks, the partnership may 
go the way of the dodo . . . .”); see also Jennifer J. Johnson, Limited Liability for Lawyers: General 
Partners Need Not Apply, 51 BUS. LAW. 85, 87 (1995) (urging law firms currently doing business in the 
GP form to switch to a limited liability entity); Tom Alleman, To LLP or Not to LLP: When Striking 
Out on Your Own, Know The Form of Business Your Practice Will Take, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, 
Sept. 5, 2003, at 3 (2003) (“For most small groups, there really are only two choices—limited liability 
partnership or some form of corporation.”); Sandy Lovell, Few Firms Form Limited-Liability Corpora-
tions, Inertia and Fear of Client Reaction Breed Reluctance, 163 N.J. L.J. 645 (2001) (stating that form-
ing a limited liability entity instead of a GP should be “a no-brainer”). 
 7. See ALAN R. BROMBERG & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN ON LIMITED 
LIABILITY PARTNERSHIPS, THE REVISED UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT, AND THE UNIFORM LIMITED 
PARTNERSHIP ACT (2001), § 1.01(e), at 15 (2003).  Some states, including New York, California, Ne-
vada, and Oregon only offer LLP status to professional firms.  Id. 
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comply with a few other formalities.8  If the partners want, the old part-
nership agreement can continue to govern the newly formed LLP.  The 
major difference between the GP and the LLP is that, in the LLP, the 
partners are liable only for debts stemming from their own conduct, or 
the conduct of someone under their supervision.9 
The creation of the LLP form allows a natural experiment of the 
theories advanced regarding the costs and benefits of the partnership 
form.  To test these theories, we collected data on the 147 law firms listed 
by Martindale-Hubble and the National Association for Law Placement 
(NALP) as having their primary offices in New York City and having 
more than twenty-five lawyers.10  Since 1994, all of these law firms have 
had the choice of whether to remain GPs or adopt LLP status.  Further-
more, we supplemented the empirical analysis with extensive interviews 
of three sets of individuals knowledgeable about and active in the debate 
regarding the choice of organizational form among New York law firms:  
law firm partners, law firm consultants, and malpractice insurers. 
If the profit-sharing or illiquidity theories of partnership fully ex-
plain the benefits of the partnership form, then all or nearly all of the 
firms in our sample should have opted for the LLP form, as it provides 
all of the same benefits of profit-sharing and lack of liquidity, without the 
costs of unlimited liability.  In contrast, if the theories asserting unlimited 
liability as the primary benefit of the partnership form are true, then a 
majority of firms should remain GPs, or the firms should break down re-
garding choice of organizational form on some observable criteria. 
Contrary to our expectations, a sizeable number of firms—about 
thirteen percent—remain GPs.  Sixty-seven percent have become LLPs.11  
This mix is puzzling.  Overall, our analysis shows no significant variation 
based on number of lawyers, number of offices, rate of firm growth, level 
of profits, the level of collegiality, or the level of information asymmetry 
between the firm and its clients.  Furthermore, on the surface, the differ-
ence between these firms is minimal.  Each has a sophisticated practice, 
with sophisticated clients.  They each provide roughly the same “prod-
uct,” namely, high-end legal services. 
The movement of most firms to LLP status and the lack of a clear 
relationship between individual firm characteristics and choice of organ-
izational form raise questions about the value of unlimited liability, at 
 
 8. See, e.g., N.Y. PARTNERSHIP LAW § 121-1500 (McKinney 2004).  In New York, a general 
partnership that renders professional services may become an LLP by filing a registration with the 
Secretary of State of New York, accompanied by a $200 filing fee.  Id. § 121-1500(a)–(c). 
 9. See BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 7, § 1.02, at 17.  States differ in the limitations on 
liability provided by LLP status.  Some states limit liability for all claims, whether rooted in contract or 
tort.  See id. § 1.01, at 2–17 (discussing the variations among state LLP statutes).  Others states limit 
liability for selected types of tort claims.  Id. 
 10. The sample also includes eight “foreign” firms whose main U.S. offices are in New York. 
 11. The remaining firms are PCs or LLCs.  For reasons discussed in more detail in Part III, we 
dropped the PCs and LLCs from the analysis. 
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least as applied to law firms.  However, the fact that a sizeable number of 
firms remain GPs undermines the profit-sharing and illiquidity-based 
theories as the sole motivation for the partnership form as well.  Because 
unlimited liability is the only meaningful distinction between the GP and 
LLP, unless many sophisticated law firms suffer from extreme inertia, it 
must be unlimited liability, rather than profit-sharing or illiquidity, that 
at least some firms perceive as valuable. 
In the end, we argue that law firms today increasingly view the 
unlimited liability associated with the GP form as burdensome and pre-
dict that, at some point in time, nearly all the firms in our sample will file 
as LLPs.  At the same time, however, the perceived benefits of unlimited 
liability are real to many law firm partners and the public assertions of 
many lawyers that the GP form provides no countervailing benefits to 
offset the costs of unlimited liability are patently inconsistent with the 
behavior of many large and prestigious New York law firms.  We con-
clude, instead, that the choice of organizational form is a complicated 
matter, dependant on a variety of factors, including the behavior of other 
similarly situated firms that the decision makers consider competitors for 
prestige and clients. 
This article proceeds as follows.  Part II reviews six theories tradi-
tionally advanced as rationales for the partnership form:  (1) insurance, 
(2) monitoring, (3) generating trust and collegiality, (4) quality signaling, 
(5) preventing grabbing and leaving, and (6) providing incentives to men-
tor. 
Although there are reasons to approach many of the traditional 
theories of partnership form with skepticism, each yields a testable hy-
pothesis that we examine in Part III.  Subject to the caveats discussed in 
Part III, our data do not support any of the partnership theories intro-
duced in Part II.  To provide insight into the choice of organizational 
form among New York law firms, we discuss in Part IV our interviews 
with three sets of individuals knowledgeable about and active in that 
choice:  law firm partners, law firm consultants, and law firm insurers.  In 
particular, our interview data indicate that unlimited liability is increas-
ingly viewed as a burden to be avoided, but also suggest that, for many 
law firm partners, the benefits of unlimited liability are real and are not 
necessarily outweighed by increasing liability fears.  Part V concludes 
that the choice of organizational form is more complicated than either 
academic researchers or practicing lawyers have recognized. 
II. THEORIES OF PARTNERSHIP FORM 
In this part, we discuss six theories advanced by researchers to jus-
tify the partnership form.  Each of these theories is dependent on one of 
three characteristics associated with partnerships:  profit-sharing, a char-
acteristic of both GPs and LLPs; illiquidity, a characteristic of both GPs 
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and LLPs; and unlimited liability, a characteristic of the GP, but not the 
LLP. 
As we elaborate throughout this section, there are reasons to doubt 
the explanatory power of many of the traditional theories.  For example, 
contrary to the assumptions of many economists, profit-sharing is not a 
unique characteristic of the partnership form and can be easily accom-
plished through an LLC or corporation, albeit with greater transaction 
costs in the case of the corporation.  In addition, illiquidity is a common 
characteristic of both LLCs and close corporations and, through the use 
of standard-form restrictions on resale, these investments can be made 
just as illiquid as the partnership interest.  Nonetheless, we test each of 
these theories of partnership form in the following Part III of this article. 
A. Insurance 
The insurance theory of partnership form is based on the perceived 
efficiency benefits of profit-sharing and is frequently invoked to explain 
the tendency of professionals to organize as partnerships.  The insurance 
theory starts by noting that professionals make a significant investment 
in human capital.12  Such investment is hard to diversify and, hence, risky.  
Furthermore, an insurance market for human capital does not exist be-
cause of moral hazard and adverse selection.  Consider a lawyer who in-
vests heavily to become a skilled bankruptcy attorney.  The return on the 
lawyer’s investment is linked to the demand for bankruptcy work.  If, for 
instance, there is a prolonged economic boom, the return on the lawyer’s 
investment is small.  The lawyer cannot mitigate this risk through insur-
ance, because any insurer—fearing moral hazard on the part of the at-
torney—would feel uncomfortable writing a policy that paid out when an 
attorney’s business was slow. 
The question becomes, then, how can the bankruptcy attorney insu-
late herself from risk.  According to some economists, she teams up and 
forms a partnership with other attorneys.  The partnership allows the at-
torney to share profits with attorneys in different areas.  Through profit-
sharing, the attorneys diversify their individual investments in human 
capital.  Moral hazard remains a problem, however, because one partner 
might shirk, knowing that she will still recoup income through the profit-
sharing arrangement.  Nonetheless, economists argue that the partners in 
a professional firm are better able to monitor (and therefore control) 
moral hazard than outside insurers. 
For the sake of analysis, we accept the premises of the insurance 
theory of partnership that profit-sharing is useful because it reduces the 
 
 12. For formal articulations of the insurance theory of partnership, see Martin Gaynor & Paul 
Gertler, Moral Hazard and Risk Spreading in Partnerships, 26 RAND J. ECON. 591 (1995); Kevin Lang 
& Peter-John Gordon, Partnerships as Insurance Devices: Theory and Evidence, 26 RAND. J. ECON. 
614 (1995). 
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risk of human capital investment and partners are better than outside in-
surers at controlling moral hazard.  From these premises, however, the 
choice of partnership form does not inevitably follow.  A corporation, 
LLC, or PC could all share profits in the same way as a partnership.  Al-
though such profit-sharing arguably entails higher transaction costs in the 
corporate form, it is not clear that those costs outweigh the benefits of 
limited liability provided by the corporate form. 
Nonetheless, as discussed in Part III of this article, an examination 
of New York law firms after the passage of the LLP statute allows at 
least a partial test of the insurance theory of partnership.  If the insur-
ance theory fully explains the advantages associated with the partnership 
form,13 then all or nearly all of the firms in our sample should be LLPs,14 
because the LLP provides all of the insurance benefits associated with 
partnerships without the associated costs of unlimited liability inherent in 
the GP form. 
B. Monitoring Fellow Partners 
The monitoring theory of partnership takes two different forms, one 
based on profit-sharing and the other based on unlimited liability. 
1. Profit-Sharing and Monitoring 
In an early article on this subject, Armen Alchian and Harold Dem-
setz proposed that employee ownership and profit-sharing are useful 
when it is hard to monitor each employee’s input in the production proc-
ess.15  By, in effect, making each employee a residual claimant on profits, 
the employee-owned firm with profit-sharing induces monitoring of each 
employee by every other employee.16  The inability to monitor an indi-
vidual employee’s input, Alchian and Demsetz claim, is the reason why 
many professional firms are employee-owned partnerships.17 
 
 13. As an empirical matter, the observed break-down among New York firms allows us only to 
reject the illiquidity and profit-sharing theories as the sole rationale behind the choice of organiza-
tional form among New York law firms.  However, as discussed supra notes 10–11 and accompanying 
text, our interview data, combined with the fact that the partnership form does not provide unique 
profit-sharing or illiquidity benefits, cause us to doubt that the illiquidity or profit-sharing based theo-
ries of partnership are even a contributing factor, much less the sole factor, that explains the benefits 
of the partnership form. 
 14. Although, in theory, if the insurance explanation fully explains the choice of organizational 
form, all firms in our sample should be LLPs, we phrase the hypothesis as all or nearly all and—
without more—would not reject the insurance theory of partnership if we were to observe a few firms 
still clinging to the GP form.  This is because, in reality, there is always a possibility that inertia, lack of 
attention, or transaction costs prevent a handful of firms from adopting the ideal organizational form. 
 15. Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Or-
ganization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777 (1972). 
 16. Id. at 785–86. 
 17. Id. at 786.  Henry Hansmann argues that Alchian and Demsetz overstate the monitoring 
problem associated with professional work.  Hansmann points out that professional firms go to great 
lengths to figure out how much each partner adds to the final product by, for example, tracking bill-
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More recently, Eugene Kandel and Edward P. Lazear have argued 
that peer pressure can produce higher effort among a firm’s members.18  
Because firm members are more likely to apply pressure on other firm 
members to perform when they empathize with those whose income they 
affect—i.e., the firm’s stakeholders—peer pressure is more likely to be 
an effective motivating device in firms in which profits are shared among 
similarly situated individuals.19  Accordingly, partnerships are more likely 
to produce higher peer pressure and induce higher effort levels than are 
firms that are not organized for profit-sharing. 
As with the insurance theory of partnership, we accept the premise 
of the monitoring theory that profit-sharing is desirable for the sake of 
analysis.  Yet the choice of partnership form does not inevitably follow 
from this premise.  As widely discussed in the worker cooperative litera-
ture, the monitoring explanation is an argument in favor of employee 
ownership rather than investor ownership of firms.20  Nonetheless an 
employee-owned firm does not have to be a partnership.  The close cor-
poration and LLC are also typically employee-owned entities in which 
the residual claimants on profits are directly involved in management. 
Nonetheless, we test the profit-sharing based monitoring theory of 
partnership in Part III of this article.  If profit-sharing through the part-
nership form fully explains the benefits associated with partnership, then 
all or nearly all of the firms in our sample should have adopted LLP 
status, as it provides all of the profit-sharing benefits of the GP form 
without the associated costs of full personal liability.21 
 
able hours.  In addition, Hansmann notes that most profit-sharing agreements reflect the individual 
productivity of each partner.  HENRY HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE 70–71 (1996); see 
also George Rutherglen & Kevin A. Kordana, A Farewell To Tournaments? The Need for an Alterna-
tive Explanation of Law Firm Structure and Growth, 84 VA. L. REV. 1695, 1697–98 (1998) (making a 
similar argument).  Others, however, have challenged Hansmann on this point, arguing that monitor-
ing the work-product of professional service providers such as lawyers is not as easy as Hansmann sug-
gests.  See, e.g., David B. Wilkins & G. Mitu Gulati, Reconceiving the Tournament of Lawyers: Track-
ing, Seeding, and Information Control in the Internal Labor Markets of Elite Law Firms, 84 VA. L. 
REV. 1581, 1598–99 (1998). 
 18. Eugene Kandel & Edward P. Lazear, Peer Pressure and Partnerships, 100 J. POL. ECON. 801, 
805 (1992) (noting that, although peer pressure guarantees higher effort level, it does not guarantee 
higher utility, as peer pressure itself is a cost borne by the firm’s members). 
 19. Id. at 816. 
 20.  See GREGORY DOW, GOVERNING THE FIRM: ECONOMIC THEORY AND WORKER CONTROL 
(2003) (discussing evidence on the question of whether worker-run enterprises engage in better moni-
toring); Avner Ben-Ner, The Life Cycle of Worker-Owned Firms in Market Economies, 10 J. ECON. 
BEHAV. & ORG. 287, 293–94 (1988) (asserting that better monitoring will occur at worker-run firms); 
Henry Hansmann, When Does Worker Ownership Work? ESOPs, Law Firms, Codetermination, and 
Economic Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1749, 1762–63 (1990) (discussing, but rejecting, the argument that 
worker control and participation arise primarily to resolve the monitoring problem). 
 21. See infra note Part III.B.3.b.i (explaining this hypothesis in more detail). 
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2. Unlimited Liability and Monitoring 
Another version of the monitoring theory asserts that unlimited li-
ability encourages monitoring of each partner by every other partner.22  
In the event of another partner’s misstep, a partner does not want to be 
on the hook for any award in excess of the partnership’s assets and insur-
ance coverage.  Accordingly, under this version of the monitoring theory, 
unlimited liability induces each partner to pay close attention to the ac-
tivities of her fellow partners.  As a result, effort and care are maximized, 
resulting in a better product. 
Because the ease and effectiveness of monitoring are likely to be a 
function of the number of offices (geographic dispersion), the number of 
lawyers (firm size), and the firm’s rate of growth, the monitoring hy-
pothesis suggests that the regression results will reveal a statistically sig-
nificant effect of the number of lawyers variable (LAWYERS), the 
number of offices variable (OFFICES), and the rate of growth variable 
(GROWTH) on the choice of organizational form.23  In addition, because 
the unlimited liability version of the monitoring theory asserts that part-
ners of LLPs monitor the quality of the firm’s output less vigilantly than 
do partners of GPs, it suggests that LLPs provide an inferior legal prod-
uct.  If this is the case, and if clients possess some knowledge about the 
quality of legal services provided by law firms, then law firms that are 
LLPs must either:  (1) charge less for the provision of legal services than 
would the same firm if it had remained a GP; or (2) charge the same 
amount, but lose clients to firms that price legal services in accordance 
with quality. 
Accordingly, if the unlimited liability version of the monitoring the-
ory is true, the empirical and interview data should reveal that either:  (1) 
firms that opted for LLPs status were forced to reduce their billing rates, 
or (2) firms that opted for LLP status experienced less revenue growth 
(that is, firms that become an LLP experience significant, abnormal, de-
 
 22. Larry E. Ribstein, Ethical Rules, Agency Costs, and Law Firm Structure, 84 VA. L. REV. 1707, 
1728 (1998) (stating that “unlimited liability, by substituting for reputational and financial capital, ar-
guably provides an important assurance to clients that law firms will discipline shirking and other self-
interested conduct of their members”). 
 23. Kandel & Lazear, supra note 18, at 812–13 (demonstrating that both the effectiveness of and 
the incentive to engage in monitoring decrease with increases in firm size and geographic dispersion).  
We did not predict whether this effect should be positive or negative, because we were unsure of the 
direction in which size, geographic dispersion, and rate of growth should impact the choice of whether 
to become an LLP.  One might surmise that large firms, geographically dispersed firms, and quickly 
growing firms find it more difficult to monitor and, therefore, choose to remain GPs in order to induce 
each partner to monitor every other partner.  In this case, we would predict a negative relationship 
between the variables LAWYERS, OFFICES, and GROWTH and the likelihood that a firm is an 
LLP.  Alternatively, one might imagine that large firms, quickly growing firms, and geographically 
dispersed firms find it so difficult to monitor that remaining GPs in the hopes of inducing more moni-
toring is pointless.  In such a case, the LLP liability shield should be more attractive and such firms 
should be more likely to form LLPs.  Under this scenario, we would predict a positive relationship 
between the variables LAWYERS, OFFICES, and GROWTH and the probability that the firm is an 
LLP. 
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creases in profits per partner (PROFITS) that the firm would not have 
experienced if the firm had remained a GP).  In addition, if LLPs are ac-
tually producing an inferior legal product, then their risk of malpractice 
liability should be higher and, as a result, their insurance premiums 
should be higher than they would be if the firm had remained a GP.  As 
such, the interview data should reveal that law firms that are LLPs pay 
higher liability insurance premiums than if they had opted to remain a 
GP. 
C. Generating Trust and Collegiality 
A third theory of partnership form involves bonding and the crea-
tion of trust among partners.  A partner, the theory goes, signals trust in 
her fellow partners by agreeing to personal liability for their actions.  
This trust creates a more congenial work environment, enhancing the 
quality of the product. 
At first glance, the trust theory of partnership—because of its reli-
ance on the unique unlimited liability characteristic of the GP form—
seems a plausible explanation for the choice of GP form.  However, as 
noted in the debate regarding the benefits of limited liability, the GP 
form is not the only mechanism for placing an owner’s personal wealth at 
stake in a business or professional enterprise.24 
Nonetheless, we test the collegiality hypothesis in Part III of this ar-
ticle.  Because larger groups, more geographically dispersed groups, and 
quickly growing groups are typically considered less collegial than small, 
stable, closely-knit groups,25 the collegiality hypothesis suggests that the 
regression results will reveal a statistically significant effect of 
LAWYERS, OFFICES, and GROWTH on the choice of organizational 
form. 
In addition, law firms that have multi-tiered partnership structures 
(TIER) are considered less collegial than those firms in which partners 
are treated equally.26  As a result, one might expect that firms with a 
 
 24. For example, the partners could form a limited liability entity, but personally guarantee 
debts.  They could also post personal bonds, or over-capitalize the corporation, rather than withdraw-
ing funds in excess of that needed for working capital.  See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 3, 
at 103–04 (arguing that voluntary corporate creditors frequently require personal guarantees or use 
other mechanisms to alter the default rule of limited liability for shareholders); Henry Hansmann & 
Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational Law, 110 YALE L.J. 387, 429–30 (2000); 
Amalia D. Kessler, Limited Liability In Context: Lessons from the French Origins of the American 
Limited Partnership, 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 511, 546 (2003). 
 25. See generally ROBERT ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE 
DISPUTES (1991) (discussing the role of extra-legal, collective norms in small, closely-knit groups); 
MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1971) (demonstrating that coordination and 
the resolution of collective action problems are more difficult for larger groups); Christopher R. Les-
lie, Trust, Distrust, and Antitrust, 82 TEX. L. REV. 515, 535–37 (2004) (discussing trust and coopera-
tion). 
 26. See Elizabeth H. Gorman, Moving Away From “Up or Out”: Determinants of Permanent 
Employment in Law Firms, 33 LAW & SOC‘Y REV. 637, 646 (1999) (noting that “[i]n a collegial organi-
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multi-tiered partnership structure value collegiality less, and hence are 
less likely to remain a GP in an effort to maintain firm collegiality.  
Therefore, the collegiality hypothesis suggests that the regression results 
will reveal a statistically significant positive effect of the TIER variable 
on the likelihood that a firm is an LLP. 
Finally, some law firms publicize their collegial environment, 
whereas others do not.  If the collegiality theory of partnership is true, 
we should observe a statistically significant negative effect of the 
COLLEGIAL variable on the probability that a law firm chooses to be-
come an LLP.27 
D. Quality Signaling 
The signaling theory of partnership takes two different forms, de-
pending on the source of the signal.  In the initial formulation, firms sig-
nal quality by adopting unlimited liability.  In the more recent articula-
tion, profit-sharing serves as the signal.  According to the quality 
signaling theory, the need for signaling arises whenever consumers are 
unable to assess the quality of a product.  As a result, they are reluctant 
to buy the product without some quality assurance. 
1. Unlimited Liability and Signaling 
One version of the quality signaling theory asserts that unlimited li-
ability encourages each partner to take more care in the provision of 
goods and services in order to avoid losing personal assets.  In addition, 
as discussed in Part II.B.2, unlimited liability is thought to encourage 
monitoring of each partner by every other partner.  Knowing these facts, 
consumers feel more comfortable about the quality of the product.  In 
other words, unlimited liability is thought to provide a credible signal of 
quality. 
There are reasons to approach the quality signaling theory with 
skepticism.  Although unlimited liability might serve as a quality signal, it 
is not the only possible signal of quality.  For example, a firm can also 
signal quality by maintaining a good reputation, established through re-
peated interactions with consumers.  For unlimited liability signaling to 
work, one must demonstrate that unlimited liability is the cheapest 
credible signal of quality. 
Despite this skepticism, we test the unlimited liability version of the 
quality signaling theory in Part III of this article.  Because the quality 
 
zation, . . . all are formally equal in status”); id. at 650–51 (finding that collegiality, as measured by 
firms’ narrative descriptions, is negatively associated with the presence of a two-tier partnership struc-
ture); Peter D. Sherer, Leveraging Human Assets in Law Firms: Human Capital Structures and Organ-
izational Capabilities, 48 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 671, 677 (1995) (“[T]iers may damage the sense of 
collegiality and mutual monitoring that exists when partners are coequals.”). 
 27. See infra notes 77–86 and accompanying text (describing this variable in more detail). 
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signaling theory depends on information asymmetry between producers 
and consumers of products (in this case, legal services), we predict that 
firms whose clients possess less information regarding the quality of legal 
services they receive should have a greater need to engage in this type of 
quality signaling than firms whose clients are well-informed regarding 
the quality of legal services they purchase.  Because more sophisticated 
clients are more likely to possess such information and because clients in 
the Fortune 250 are more likely to be sophisticated than clients that are 
not, we predicted a significant, positive effect of the Fortune 250 variable 
(FORTUNE) on the probability that the firm is an LLP.28 
In addition, because research shows that more sophisticated clients 
and clients with a higher number of in-house counsel are more informed 
about the quality of legal services provided by law firms,29 this version of 
the signaling hypothesis suggests that the logit model results will reveal a 
statistically significant positive effect of both the average and the total 
number of in-house counsel (IN-HOUSE-AVG and IN-HOUSE-
TOTAL) and the Fortune 250 variable (FORTUNE) on the probability 
that a firm is an LLP.30  Finally, if becoming an LLP really sends a nega-
tive signal to clients about the quality of legal services, then firms that 
become an LLP should either:  (1) charge less for legal services than they 
otherwise could if the firm had remained a GP; or (2) see a significant, 
abnormal, negative change in profits-per-partner (PROFITS) that the 
firm would not have experienced if it had remained a GP. 
2. Profit-Sharing and Signaling 
Jonathan Levin and Steven Tadelis advance a different signaling 
theory of partnership, focusing on profit-sharing.31  They start with the 
notion that an employee-owned firm engaged in profit-sharing is less in-
clined than a corporation to hire new workers.32  In a profit-sharing part-
nership, each partner cares about profits per partner, not total profits.  
As a result, a new partner will not be welcomed into the firm unless her 
contribution to firm profits is greater than the profits produced by the 
average partner.  In contrast, because a corporation cares about total 
 
 28. Cf. Abram Chayes & Antonia H. Chayes, Corporate Counsel and the Elite Law Firm, 37 
STAN. L. REV. 277, 290–93 (1985) (discussing the important role of in-house counsel in monitoring and 
selecting outside counsel, especially at the largest American corporations); John C. Coates IV, Ex-
plaining Variation in Takeover Defenses: Blame the Lawyers, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1301, 1310 n.40 (2001) 
(“Older, larger, and more profitable companies are more likely to have better and larger in-house le-
gal staffs more capable of monitoring outside firms.”). 
 29. ROBERT L. NELSON, PARTNERS WITH POWER: THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE 
LARGE LAW FIRM 59 (1988); see also Mark C. Suchman, Working Without a Net: The Sociology of 
Legal Ethics in Corporate Litigation, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 837, 856 (1998). 
 30. See infra notes 50, 61–62 and accompanying text (describing these variables). 
 31. Jonathan Levin & Steven Tadelis, Profit-Sharing and the Role of Professional Partnerships, 
at (Stanford Inst. for Econ. Policy, Research Paper No. 03-031, 2004), http://ssrn.com/abstract=500322 
(“We take the defining feature of a partnership to be redistribution of profits among partners.”). 
 32. Id. 
KRAWIEC.DOC 6/20/2005  10:42 AM 
No. 1] THE ECONOMICS OF LIMITED LIABILITY 119 
profits, it will bring in new workers if the marginal benefit of that worker 
is greater than their marginal cost to the firm.  Because the partnership 
focuses on average profits rather than the marginal increase in profits, a 
profit-sharing partnership has an incentive to hire higher quality workers 
than the corporation.33 
In markets where there are informational disparities, however, both 
the corporation and the partnership have an incentive to hire less able 
workers, hoping that the consumer will fail to notice the resulting loss in 
quality.  Levin and Tadelis conclude that the incentive to “cheat” on 
worker quality is mitigated in a partnership because of the partnership’s 
initial preference for higher quality workers.34  They argue that this ex-
plains why professional firms are more apt than other types of firms to 
organize as partnerships:  the market for professional services (for exam-
ple, law, medicine, or accounting) contains large informational dispari-
ties, making the choice of the partnership form more profitable.35 
As previously discussed in Parts II.A and B of this article, the part-
nership form is unnecessary to attain the benefits of profit-sharing.  As a 
theoretical matter, we thus find it unlikely that any partnership theory 
based on profit-sharing, including signaling theories, can account for the 
choice of organizational form among New York law firms.  Nonetheless, 
we test the profit-sharing version of the quality signaling theory in Part 
III of this article.  If Levin and Tadelis are correct that the partnership 
form signals profit-sharing to customers, and if this fact fully explains the 
benefits provided by the partnership form, then all or nearly all of the 
firms in our sample should be LLPs, as the LLP provides all of the profit-
sharing benefits of the partnership form without the accompanying costs 
of unlimited liability necessitated by the GP form.36 
E. Preventing “Grabbing and Leaving” 
According to the grab and leave theory of partnership, certain types 
of businesses—specifically, the practice of law—benefit from an up or 
out system of partnership.37  This is because, over time, attorneys develop 
client-specific assets in the form of knowledge and expertise in the han-
 
 33. Levin and Tadelis demonstrate that this is not always an optimal result.  If there is no asym-
metric information in the market, the partnership operates inefficiently.  It hires workers of too high a 
quality and provides too high a quality of product.  Id. at 16.  Put another way, in the “full-
information” market consumers prefer to pay less and receive a lower quality product than the profit-
sharing partnership produces. 
 34. Id. at 12. 
 35. This is the essence of proposition 3 in their paper.  Id. at 13. 
 36. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (describing this hypothesis in more detail). 
 37. See, e.g., MARC GALANTER & THOMAS PALAY, TOURNAMENT OF LAWYERS: THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF THE BIG LAW FIRM (1991); Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Sharing 
Among the Human Capitalists: An Economic Inquiry into the Corporate Law Firm and How Partners 
Split Profits, 37 STAN. L. REV. 313, 315 (1985); James B. Rebitzer & Lowell J. Taylor, When Knowl-
edge Is an Asset: Explaining the Organizational Structure of Large Law Firms (working paper) (on file 
with authors). 
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dling of specific clients.  This expertise gives senior lawyers significant 
power over their employers.  By threatening to “grab” their clients and 
leave the firm, these lawyers can extract a higher share of the firm’s prof-
its. 
To prevent senior lawyers from “grabbing” their clients and leaving 
the firm, law firms developed the up or out system of partnership in 
which associates are either fired before they get a chance to develop a re-
lationship with clients or are promoted to residual claimants on the firm’s 
assets.38  This system is more important in law firms than in conventional 
firms because law firms lack the ability to establish property rights in cli-
ent-specific knowledge. 
The partnership structure effectively eliminates the defection of 
partners, by maximizing profits per partner, rather than total profits.39  
According to Rebitzer and Taylor, only under the partnership structure 
can senior attorneys be paid enough to prevent them from grabbing and 
leaving with the firm’s clients because the partnership structure results in 
higher profits per partner, even though the corporation results in higher 
total profits.40 
The Rebitzer and Taylor theory, however, is not a convincing ex-
planation of the benefits of the partnership form.  Rebitzer and Taylor 
assume that corporations are, by definition, entrepreneur-owned firms 
and that partnerships are, by definition, employee-owned firms.41  Be-
cause employee-owned firms are more profitable under certain circum-
stances that are important to professional firms, many economists believe 
that this fact explains the prevalence of the partnership structure among 
professional firms and the prevalence of the corporate structure among 
industrial firms.  However, neither corporations nor LLCs are necessarily 
entrepreneur-owned firms.  In fact, it is quite common in close corpora-
tions and small LLCs to see a complete overlap of ownership and man-
agement, as is the case in a partnership. 
Nonetheless, we test the grab and leave hypothesis in Part III of this 
article.  The LLP and GP are identical in the extent to which they foster 
profit-sharing and would thus equally prevent grabbing and leaving.  Ac-
cordingly, if the grab and leave theory fully explains the advantages of 
partnership relative to other organizational forms, then all or nearly all 
of the firms in our sample should be LLPs because the LLP provides all 
 
 38. The firm is unable to write enforceable contracts that effectively prevent grabbing and leav-
ing due to the ABA Model Rules, which prohibit contracts that limit a client’s freedom to choose her 
lawyer.  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.6 (2004); Robert W. Hillman, Organizational 
Choices of Professional Service Firms: An Empirical Study, 58 BUS. LAW. 1387, 1388–89 (2003); Re-
bitzer & Taylor, supra note 37. 
 39. Rebitzer & Taylor, supra note 37, at 10. 
 40. Id. at 12. 
 41. Id. 
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of the benefits of profit-sharing without any of the GP’s associated costs 
stemming from unlimited liability.42 
F. Incentives to Mentor 
One of the more creative justifications for the partnership form in-
volves mentoring.43  The mentoring theory begins from the premise that 
much professional work requires the development of human capital and 
many professionals require mentoring in order to enhance their skills.  
The junior associate, for instance, needs a senior partner to teach her 
how to conduct a trial or close a deal.  As the professional ages, however, 
she has an incentive to horde her knowledge and avoid mentoring new 
entrants to the profession.  She would prefer to take her knowledge and 
leave the firm, keeping all of the benefits of her knowledge to herself.  
Partnerships, however, are relatively illiquid forms of investment, mak-
ing exit difficult.  To maintain a pool of skilled workers to promote, the 
senior professional engages in mentoring.  This mentoring is profitable 
because it increases the return on the partner’s illiquid investment in the 
partnership. 
Mentoring is not a wholly satisfactory explanation for the existence 
of partnership and almost certainly fails to explain the choice of organ-
izational form among New York law firms.  Close corporations, LLCs, 
and LLPs also represent relatively illiquid investments.  In fact, such in-
vestments can be made just as illiquid as a partnership interest through 
the use of fairly routine restrictions on the transfer of interests.  In addi-
tion, although the partnership default rules create an illiquid investment, 
as an empirical matter most partnership agreements have buyout provi-
sions ameliorating this effect.44 
Nonetheless, we test the mentoring theory in Part III of this article.  
Because there is no liquidity difference between the GP and LLP (in fact, 
a firm that files for LLP status need not alter the underlying GP agree-
ment, leaving any buyout provisions completely unaltered), if mentoring 
fully explains the advantage of the partnership relative to other organiza-
tional forms, then all or nearly all of the firms in our sample should be 
LLPs.  This is because, like all of the partnership theories based on illiq-
uidity or profit-sharing explanations, the LLP provides all of the pur-
ported benefits of the GP, without the accompanying costs of unlimited 
liability.45 
 
 42. See supra note 37 and accompanying text (explaining this hypothesis in more detail). 
 43. See Alan Morrison & William J. Wilhelm, Jr., Partnership Firms, Reputation and Human 
Capital Oxford Fin. Research Center, Working Paper No. 2003-FE-02, 2003), http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=373440. 
 44. See Larry E. Ribstein, Why Corporations?, 1 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 183, 195 (2004). 
 45. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (explaining this hypothesis in more detail). 
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III. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
A. Data Collection 
To explore the choice and determinants of organizational form, we 
collected data on the choice of organizational form among New York law 
firms—that is, law firms listing New York City as their primary office—
with more than twenty-five lawyers.46  We limited our study to New York 
City firms for a variety of reasons.47  By restricting our sample to firms in 
a particular region, we were able to minimize variations in the choice of 
organizational form based on geographic or cultural differences, differ-
ences in the state legal regime or ethics code, and differences in state and 
local tax codes.48 
Under the supervision of the two authors, research assistants col-
lected most of the data.  The data, along with a detailed memo describing 
the collection process, are publicly available at http://www.law.unc.edu/ 
data/economicsoflimitedliability. 
There are 147 firms in the sample.  We used seven sources to build 
the dataset:  (1) Martindale-Hubble, both print and web versions; (2) 
NALP, both print and web versions; (3) filings from the New York Sec-
retary of State; (4) the list of profits per partner for the top 200 law firms 
published by the American Lawyer; (5) American Lawyer Media, Cor-
 
 46. We did not study law firms with fewer than twenty-five attorneys.  These small firms may 
differ from their larger counterparts in ways that significantly affect their choice of organizational 
form, rendering them poor subjects for our study.  For example, very small firms could differ from 
large firms in terms of culture, practice area, and the impact of various laws (such as the New York 
City tax on LLPs).  In addition, a small association of lawyers may be less a “firm” than a grouping of 
lawyers that share office space and resources, but lack a common goal, history, and culture.  See Bruce 
M. Price, How Green Was My Valley? An Examination of Tournament Theory as a Governance 
Mechanism in Silicon Valley Law Firms, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 731, 742 (2003) (excluding law firms of 
fewer than ten lawyers from an empirical study of Silicon Valley firms for similar reasons). 
 47. Bob Hillman, who constructed a nationwide database of law firms, has done the other major 
empirical study examining the choice of organizational form by law firms.  See Hillman, supra note 38, 
at 1397–1403.  Although a welcome addition to the literature, Hillman does not use the data to test the 
economic theories concerning partnerships.  Eric Talley and John Romley also conduct a major na-
tionwide empirical study.  John Romley & Eric Talley, Uncorporated Professionals (CLEO Research 
Paper Series No. C0418, 2004).  We discuss their results infra note 77. 
 48. For example, converting from a PC to an LLP has significant negative tax consequences.  
Johnson, supra note 6, at 85 n.19 (“While a PC may also convert to an LLC or an LLP, there are sig-
nificant tax impediments to such a conversion in that it will be treated as a liquidation under I.R.C. 
§ 336 (1988).”).  In addition, many firms in states whose PC statute (unlike New York’s) provided an 
advantageous liability shield converted from GPs to PCs some time ago.  As a result, these firms are 
effectively prohibited from filing as an LLP, even if they might desire to do so.  Similarly, in some ju-
risdictions, local tax codes may affect the choice of organizational form.  For example, both New York 
City and New York State tax PCs more heavily than partnerships.  See Terrence A. Oved, New York 
State Limited Liability Partnerships, 67 N.Y. ST. B.J., Mar.–Apr. 1995, at 38, 39 (noting that “[g]eneral 
partnerships do not pay . . . state tax on their profit but rather a 4% unincorporated business tax to 
New York City” and “a law firm organized as a professional corporation must make an annual tax 
payment of up to 1.8% and approximately 9% of its net income, respectively, to New York State and 
New York City”).  Presumably because of these tax considerations, as well as the fact that New York’s 
PC statute is not a superior liability shield to the LLP, only two firms filed for PC status after the LLP 
statute was enacted. 
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porate Counsel Division, Directory of In-House Law Departments at the 
Top 250 Companies (The Directory of In-House Departments);49 (6) in-
dividual law firm websites; and (7) telephone conversations with selected 
law firms to verify or clarify certain information.  We then supplemented 
this empirical data with a series of interviews of individuals active in and 
knowledgeable about the choice of organizational form by New York law 
firms. 
1. Number of Lawyers (LAWYERS), Number of Offices (OFFICES), 
and Growth Rate (GROWTH) 
Martindale-Hubble and NALP provided firm names, number of 
lawyers (LAWYERS), number of offices (OFFICES), choice of organ-
izational form (FORM), and was used to calculate each firm’s growth 
rate (GROWTH).  We verified the Martindale-Hubble and NALP in-
formation through the New York Secretary of State’s office, by consult-
ing firm websites and, in a few cases, by calling the firm’s offices to verify 
information that remained unclear after consulting the website. 
LAWYERS is the total number of attorneys at each firm in 2004.  
OFFICES is the total number of each firm’s separate offices in 2004.  
LAWYERS and OFFICES were collected from the Martindale-Hubble 
website.50  OFFICES was then cross-checked against each firm’s web-
site.51 
GROWTH is the yearly percentage change in each firm’s total 
number of attorneys, averaged from 1994–2003.52  For reasons detailed 
below, GROWTH was calculated using two sources:  the print versions 
of NALP and Martindale-Hubble.  This calculation was done by dividing 
the firms into three categories:  (1) firms that NALP listed in every year 
for the period 1994–2003; (2) firms that NALP did not list for any year 
 
 49. A searchable version of The Directory of In-House Departments is available at http:// 
solis.365media.com/alm/search.asp?cat=987223.  The Directory of In-House Departments includes 
information collected and printed in the November issue of American Lawyer Media’s Corporate 
Counsel magazine in the article entitled Who Represents America’s Biggest Companies?, as well as 
additional biographical data that was independently compiled by American Lawyer Media’s Corpo-
rate Counsel Division.  We compiled a list of the number of each firm’s Fortune 250 clients, if any, and 
the number of in-house counsel employed by those clients by searching the directory in May 2004. 
 50. The homepage for Martindale-Hubble is http://martindale.com/xp/Martindale/home.xml. 
 51. When the number of offices listed on the firm’s website conflicted with the number of offices 
provided by Martindale-Hubble, we used the number of offices listed on the firm’s website.  Both the 
Martindale-Hubble search and the website cross-checks were conducted in March 2004. 
 52. Except as otherwise noted, we include within the attorney count for GROWTH all firm 
members with a J.D. degree, including partners, associates, counsel, and of counsel, but did not include 
retired partners.  We include individuals regardless of whether the individual has been admitted to a 
bar or whether bar passage is still pending.  Data on the number of lawyers are not available for all 
firms for every year between 1994 and 2003.  In such cases, GROWTH is the average growth rate for 
the subset of years for which growth data are available. 
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during the period 1994–2003; and (3) firms that NALP listed in some 
years during the period 1994–2002, but not in others.53 
For a variety of reasons, NALP is both a more reliable and more 
user-friendly source for calculating law firm growth rates.54  Accordingly, 
we used NALP to calculate GROWTH whenever possible. 
For the first category of firms (those listed in NALP every year for 
the period 1994–2003), we used NALP data for every year.55  For the 
second category of firms (those that NALP did not list for any year dur-
ing the period 1994–2003), we used Martindale-Hubble data for every 
year.56 
For the third category of firms (those listed in NALP for some 
years, but not for others), we compared the available NALP data to the 
Martindale-Hubble data for any missing NALP years and determined 
whether the Martindale-Hubble data followed the yearly trend in growth 
rates calculated from the NALP data.  If consistent, we used the Martin-
dale-Hubble data for the years the firm was not listed in NALP.  If in-
consistent, we disregarded the previously collected NALP data and re-
calculated the firm’s growth rate using Martindale-Hubble data for every 
year. 
2. Organizational Form (FORM), Filing Date (DATE), Whether the 
Firm Is Domestic or Foreign (FOREIGN), and Designation of New 
York City as the Firm’s Main Office 
We verified each firm’s organizational form (and, for firms that 
were organized as LLPs, LLCs, or PCs, collected filing date information) 
 
 53. Due to inconsistencies and apparent errors in reporting by NALP and/or Martindale-Hubble 
during the time frame of our study, various firm-specific decisions were made about how certain in-
formation on GROWTH would be treated.  These decisions are detailed in a memo available on our 
website at http://www.law.unc.edu/data/economicsoflimitedliability. 
 54. For example, NALP provides information on firm demographics that includes the number of 
lawyers (although, as discussed infra note 55, this number is sometimes a firmwide number and at 
other times an officewide number).  In contrast, Martindale-Hubble lists lawyers within a firm by 
name and does not provide a total number, thus increasing the likelihood of error caused when indi-
vidual names (in some cases, more than 1000) must be counted by hand.  Furthermore, Martindale-
Hubble sometimes lists all of the firm’s lawyers under the heading for the New York office.  At other 
times, it lists only the New York lawyers under this heading.  As a result, every office for every firm 
must be cross-checked against every other office for that firm to determine whether lawyers have been 
double-listed under both New York and a branch office. 
 55. NALP lists each firm’s number of attorneys under “Firm Demographics.”  Sometimes this 
number represents each attorney employed by the firm.  At other times, it represents only the number 
of attorneys in the New York office.  When the “Firm Demographics” listed only the New York attor-
neys, attorneys from other offices were added in from the firm’s “Narrative Description” or from the 
“Other Offices” category. 
 56. See supra note 54.  To calculate GROWTH from Martindale-Hubble, we had to hand-count 
the attorneys that were listed by name in every office for each firm.  On some occasions, Martindale-
Hubble did not list associates, but instead listed only partners, counsel, and of-counsel.  In order to 
maintain a consistent counting method for each firm across time, if the firm did not list associates in 
any single year, we did not count associates—even if they were listed—in any other year. 
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from filings with the New York Secretary of State’s office.57  We consid-
ered a firm’s main office to be located in New York City if the Martin-
dale-Hubble website designated the New York City office as the firm’s 
“main office.”  If Martindale-Hubble reported a firm as having multiple 
main offices, we concluded that the firm’s main office was in New York 
City, so long as one of the main offices was located in New York City. 
FOREIGN indicates those firms headquartered outside of the 
United States, but who report to Martindale-Hubble that their main 
United States office is located in New York City.  All main office results 
were cross-checked against each individual firm website.  If the individ-
ual website conflicted with the designation in Martindale-Hubble, we 
listed the main office as it appeared on the firm’s website.58 
3. Profits Per Partner (PROFITS) 
The American Lawyer magazine provided the partner profit data.  
American Lawyer has two series of profit data.  One series reports prof-
its per partner on the 100 most profitable firms in the United States (the 
AmLaw 100).  A second series, the AmLaw 200, provides profit data on 
the “second 100”—firms that rank between 101 and 200 in terms of prof-
itability.59  Thirty-six firms in the sample are among the 200 most profit-
able law firms in the country. 
4. Average Number of In-House Counsel (IN-HOUSE-AVG), Total 
Number of In-House Counsel (IN-HOUSE-TOTAL), and Number 
of Clients in the Fortune 250 (FORTUNE) 
The number of a firm’s clients in the Fortune 250 was used as a 
proxy for client sophistication and, thus, for the level of information 
asymmetry between lawyer and client.  The theory behind the 
FORTUNE variable is that firms that have more clients in the Fortune 
250 have clients who are more informed regarding the quality and pricing 
of legal services than do law firms with fewer numbers of clients in the 
Fortune 250.  As a result, there is a lower level of information asymmetry 
 
 57. We gathered this information in March 2004, from a searchable website maintained by The 
New York Department of State.  The website is located at http://appsext5.dos.state.ny.us/corp_public/ 
enter_search.  In several cases, the choice of organizational form indicated by Martindale-Hubble or 
NALP varied from information provided by the law firm’s website and the New York Department of 
State.  In these cases, we used the information provided by the New York Department of State. 
 58. For example, Martindale-Hubble lists Milberg, Weiss as having its main office in New York.  
However, the firm’s website indicates that its main office is in San Diego.  Accordingly, we adopted 
the website’s designation of the firm’s main office and excluded Milberg, Weiss from our sample.  This 
cross-check was conducted in March 2004. 
 59. The American Lawyer publishes the AmLaw 100 in the July edition of the magazine and the 
AmLaw 200 in the August edition of the magazine.  See, e.g., The AmLaw 100, 2004, THE AM. LAW., 
July 2004, at 91; The Amlaw 200, 2004, THE AM. LAW., Aug. 2004, at 83.  Data on the AmLaw 100 
were available for the years 1993–2003.  The American Lawyer only published data on the AmLaw 
200 for the years 1999–2003. 
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between the lawyer and client in these firms than in others and they, 
therefore, have less need to signal quality by being a GP. 
In addition, both the average number of in-house counsel (IN-
HOUSE-AVG) and the total number of in-house counsel (IN-HOUSE-
TOTAL) were used as a proxy for the level of client-lawyer information 
asymmetry.60  Consistent with prior research on the role of in-house 
counsel in reducing this asymmetry, our theory was that firms with a 
higher number of both average and total in-house counsel should have 
lower levels of information asymmetry and, therefore, less need to signal 
quality by remaining a GP. 
The Directory of In-House Departments provided client informa-
tion and information on each client’s number of in-house counsel.61  Of 
the 118 firms that are LLPs or GPs, only forty firms have clients in the 
Fortune 250. 
5. Starting Associate Salaries (SALARY), Multi-Tiered Partnership 
Structure (TIER), and Collegiality (COLLEGIAL) 
NALP provided starting associate salaries, whether the firm used a 
multi-tiered partnership structure, and whether the firm self-identified as 
collegial.  TIER indicates whether or not the firm employs a multi-tier 
partnership structure.  TIER was collected from the NALP On-Line Di-
rectory of Legal Employers for the fifty-four firms in our sample that are 
included in the on-line directory.62 
COLLEGIAL indicates whether or not the firm self-identifies as 
collegial.  Firms can identify themselves as collegial through the narrative 
description that they provide to NALP for publication.  A research assis-
tant labeled the sixty firms in our sample that were listed in the 2002–
2003 NALP directory (print version) as congenial/collegial or not conge-
nial/collegial.  To determine which category the firm best fit in, we exam-
ined the narrative information included in their NALP entry.  Descrip-
tions of the firms that stressed “teamwork,” a “congenial” or “collegial” 
environment, and “friendly,” or “close-working relationships” were 
 
 60. See Ryon Lancaster & Brian Uzzi, From Colleague to Employee: Determinants of Changing 
Career Governance Structures in Elite U.S. Law Firms (working draft, on file with authors) (using this 
same variable to test the level of information asymmetry in the market for legal services). 
 61. The searchable directory is available at http://solis.365media.com/alm/search.asp?cat= 
987223.  The variables were constructed by searching for each firm’s name in the directory.  If the firm 
has Fortune 250 clients, then the directory provides the client names, along with the number of in-
house-counsel employed by each client. 
 62. This information was collected from the NALP web directory in June 2004.  The NALP web 
directory is located at http://www.nalpdirectory.com.  There is an entry on each form entitled “Part-
nership Data.”  One item under this heading is “Two or more tiers?,” to which firms respond “yes” or 
“no.” 
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coded as collegial.  Firms that did not mention any of these characteris-
tics in their narrative description were coded as uncollegial.63 
One might expect that every firm would advertise its congeniality as 
a marketing tool, rendering firms’ narrative statements a poor proxy for 
collegiality.  In fact, however, there is great variation in the narrative de-
scriptions and only forty-seven percent of the New York firms in our 
sample were coded as collegial.64  In addition, COLLEGIAL was nega-
tively associated with TIER as one would expect if these two variables 
are acting as a proxy for the firm’s level of collegiality. 
SALARY measures each firm’s starting associate salary as reported 
in the NALP On-Line Directory of Legal Employers.65  SALARY was 
calculated for the fifty-four firms in our sample for which such informa-
tion was provided in the On-Line Directory. 
6. Raw Data 
The raw data for New York law firms are attached as Appendices 
A–D to this article.  Appendix A lists LAWYERS, FORM, OFFICES, 
DATE, and GROWTH for all firms in the sample.  Appendix B reports 
TIER, SALARY, and COLLEGIAL for the subset of firms for which 
such information was available.66  Appendix C lists IN-HOUSE-AVG, 
IN-HOUSE-TOTAL, and FORTUNE for the subset of firms for which 
such information is available.  Appendix D contains the PROFITS data. 
B. Empirical Results 
1. General Results 
Tables 1, 2, and 3 report summary statistics for the data collected on 
New York law firms.  As is evident, the large majority of firms (67%) are 
LLPs, whereas only 13% are GPs.67  The average number of offices is 
higher for LLPs than for GPs, as is the average number of lawyers.  As 
demonstrated in the logit model in Part II.B.3.b, however, neither of 
these variables is a statistically significant predictor of the choice of or-
ganizational form. 
 
 63. See Gorman, supra note 26, at 650 (using the NALP narrative descriptions to construct a 
dummy variable for whether or not the firm was collegial). 
 64. Similarly, in a national study of collegiality at law firms using this same coding method, only 
about twenty percent of the firms were coded as collegial and collegiality was negatively associated 
with a multi-tiered partnership structure.  See id. at 650–51. 
 65. This information was collected from the NALP web directory in June 2004.  All salaries are 
those reported for 2003, except in the case of two firms that provided only 2004 salary information.  
The firms are:  Thacher, Proffit, & Wood and Friedman, Kaplan, Siler, & Adelman. 
 66. Note that information on each variable is not available for all firms in Appendix B.  A blank 
space indicates that information on this variable was unavailable for the firm in question. 
 67. The remaining firms are PCs and LLCs.  See infra note 69 (breaking down these numbers). 
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TABLE 1 
OVERALL STATISTICS 
Firm Type Total Number Percentage of Sample 
GP 19 13% 
LLP 99 67% 
PC 27 18% 
LLC  2  1% 
TABLE 2 
GP SUMMARY STATISTICS 
Avg. Number of Offices 4.263158 
Std. Dev. Number of Offices 3.841905 
Avg. Number of Lawyers 181.1579 
Std. Dev. Number of Lawyers 214.7811 
TABLE 3 
LLP SUMMARY STATISTICS 
Avg. Number of Offices 5.232323 
Std. Dev. Number of Offices 6.54471 
Avg. Number of Lawyers 240.798 
Std. Dev. Number of Lawyers 446.6612 
2. Filing Patterns 
In order to examine law firm filing patterns, we divided the firms in 
our sample into large firms, small firms, and elite firms.68  Information 
regarding the LLP filing dates of large firms, small firms, and elite firms 
is graphically depicted in Chart 1. 
As the bar chart shows, LLP filings peaked in 1994–1995, the two-
year period after New York’s LLP statute became effective, and were 
distributed roughly equally between large and small firms.  Few elite 
firms filed during this time period. 
LLP filings then tapered off, but began rising again between 2001 
and 2003.  Unlike the 1994–1995 filing period, large firms dominate the 
LLP filings during the 2001–2003 period.  In particular, a large number of 
elite law firms filed during this period, roughly coinciding with two 
events:  the Arthur Andersen trial and bankruptcy, and the large num-
bers of securities fraud suits accompanying the stock market downtown 
associated with the burst of the “dotcom” bubble. 
 
 68. “Large firms” are firms with more than fifty lawyers in 2004.  “Small firms” are firms with 
between twenty-five and fifty lawyers in 2004.  “Elite firms” are defined as firms with more than $1 
million in profits per partner for 2002. 
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CHART 1 
 
 
Given the large numbers of securities offerings in which these firms 
are involved, and the corresponding liability fears that may result, we 
theorized that many large and elite law firms may have consciously cho-
sen this time frame in which to seek liability protection.  This conjecture 
is supported by our interview data.  Our follow-up interviews reveal that 
both rising liability fears and the Arthur Andersen bankruptcy were sali-
ent factors associated with many firms’ decisions to opt for LLP status.69 
LLP filing dates plotted against 2003 PROFITS are graphically de-
picted in Chart 2.70  The chart shows a rough bunching of LLP filings that 
corresponds with PROFITS.  As discussed in more detail in Part IV, we 
believe that this is attributable to a concern by firms with the negative 
signal that may accompany an LLP filing.  However, as more firms that 
the decision-making firm considers to be a competitor convert to LLP 
status, the negative signal is muted.  For this reason, firms tend to file 
with their cohort.  The interview data supports this notion that firms ac-
count for the actions of competitor firms when making a decision regard-
ing organizational form.71 
Two apparent outliers in Chart 2 are noteworthy:  the LLP filing of 
Milbank, Tweed on February 1, 1999, and the LLP filing of Skadden, 
Arps on May 25, 2001.  Both of these firms filed early relative to firms 
with comparable profits-per-partner, and both filings were noted with in-
terest by their cohort firms.  The Milbank filing closely followed the con-
 
 69. See infra notes 120–23 and accompanying text (discussing Arthur Andersen and rising liabil-
ity fears as salient factors in law firms’ choice of organizational form). 
 70. Because per partner profit data is reported in American Lawyer for only the 200 most profit-
able firms in the United States, only thirty-six of our original sample of 147 firms are included on this 
chart. 
 71. See infra notes 118–19 and accompanying text (discussing this phenomenon). 
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viction and sentencing of Milbank partner John Gellene in the summer 
of 1998 to fifteen months in federal prison for filing false declarations in 
a bankruptcy proceeding.72  Although several partners at New York firms 
surmised during interviews that the Gellene incident may have made li-
ability matters more salient at Milbank and prompted the firm’s early fil-
ing, our interviews with Milbank suggest that this was not the case.73  The 
Skadden filing in 2001 gained the attention of many elite New York firms 
and, according to our interviews, caused many firms to begin reevaluat-
ing the decision of whether to become an LLP.74  Although many inter-
viewees indicated that the firm eventually decided to wait until firms 
within their cohort other than Skadden were prepared to file before their 
own firm was willing to file, the event was clearly a salient trigger in 
many firms’ decision-making processes.75 
CHART 2 
 
Another area in which law firms compete is starting associate sala-
ries.76  Accordingly, we predicted that law firms might also look to the 
 
 72. See MILTON REGAN, EAT WHAT YOU KILL: THE FALL OF A WALL STREET LAWYER (2004); 
Alison Frankel, Trading One Striped Suit (with Cuffs) for Another, AM. LAW., Oct. 1998, at 10 (dis-
cussing the Gellene incident). 
 73. Confidential interview with partner of Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy LLP in New 
York, N.Y. (June 16, 2004) (attributed with permission of interview subject) (interview notes on file 
with the authors). 
 74. Confidential interviews with law firm partners (interview notes on file with the authors). 
 75. Id. 
 76. See Bruce M. Price, A Butterfly Flaps Its Wings in Menlo Park: An Organizational Analysis 
of Increases in Associate Salaries (unpublished draft, on file with authors) (demonstrating that law 
firms compete on associate salaries, even when doing so appears to make little sense as an economic 
matter). 
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Associate Salary versus Filing Date
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behavior of firms with whom they compete on starting salaries in making 
decisions about organizational form, resulting in clusters when associate 
starting salaries are plotted against filing dates.  LLP filing dates plotted 
against first year associate starting salaries are graphically depicted in 
Chart 3.  Unfortunately, at this point in time, there is so little variation in 
starting associate salaries among the New York firms for which data is 
available that the chart reveals no useful information. 
CHART 3 
  
3. Testing the Partnership Theories 
a. Profit-Sharing and Illiquidity-Based Theories 
In Part II of this article, we discussed four theories of partnership 
that are based on the purported benefits of profit sharing through part-
nership:  insurance, monitoring, quality signaling, and preventing grab-
bing and leaving.  In addition, we discussed one partnership theory—
mentoring—that relies on the illiquidity benefits of the partnership form.  
As noted, there are reasons to approach each of these theories with sus-
picion because, assuming that profit-sharing and illiquidity are valuable 
attributes in at least some business and professional organizations, the 
partnership form is unnecessary to provide these benefits.  Both profit-
sharing and illiquidity can be, and frequently are, replicated through a 
variety of organizational forms, including the LLC, PC, and corporation. 
Nonetheless, each of these theories generates a testable hypothesis.  
If any of these partnership theories fully explains the benefits of the 
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partnership form, then all or nearly all of the firms in our sample should 
be LLPs, because the LLP provides the same illiquidity and profit-
sharing features of the GP, without the accompanying costs of unlimited 
liability.  Contrary to the predictions of the illiquidity and profit-sharing 
based hypotheses, a sizeable number of firms in our sample remain GPs. 
Standing alone, however, our empirical data allow us only to reject 
the illiquidity and profit-sharing based theories of partnership as the sole 
motivation for the choice of organizational form among New York law 
firms.  However, our theoretical objections to these theories, detailed 
throughout this article, cause us to doubt that they are even contributing 
factors in the choice of organizational form, much less decisive ones. 
b. Limited Liability, Monitoring, and Collegiality 
i. Results 
As discussed in Part II of this article, several partnership theories 
rely on the purported benefits of unlimited liability.  Under the monitor-
ing theory, unlimited liability induces partners to more carefully scruti-
nize each other.  This monitoring becomes more difficult with increased 
size, rate of growth, and geographic dispersion of the firm.  In contrast, 
the collegiality theory of partnership asserts that the willingness to face 
personal liability for a partner’s acts generates trust and collegiality 
within the firm.  Larger groups, quickly growing groups, more geographi-
cally dispersed groups, and firms with multi-tiered partnership structures 
are considered less collegial than small, closely-knit groups, in which all 
members are treated equally.  In addition, some law firms self-identify as 
collegial in their NALP narrative statement whereas others do not.  Ac-
cordingly, the monitoring and collegiality partnership theories each yield 
a testable hypothesis:  if either of these theories is a significant rationale 
for the choice of organizational form among New York law firms, then 
regression results should reveal a statistically significant effect of 
LAWYERS, OFFICES, and GROWTH, and in the case of the collegial-
ity theory, TIER and COLLEGIAL, on the choice of organizational 
form. 
In order to test this hypothesis, we estimated a logit model with the 
dependent discrete variable being whether the firm was an LLP or GP.  
The independent variables are LAWYERS, OFFICES, GROWTH, and 
whether the firm is domestic or foreign (FOREIGN).  The model had 
117 observations.  Although there are a total of 118 GPs and LLPs in the 
data, GROWTH was unavailable for one firm. 
As Table 4 reports, the coefficients on all variables are insignifi-
cant.77  Note, however, that OFFICES and LAWYERS are correlated, 
 
 77. We also ran a probit model, which assumes a slightly different structure.  See WILLIAM H. 
GREENE, ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS 814–15 (4th ed. 2000).  As in the logit model, the coefficients on 
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raising the possibility of a multicollinearity problem.  Without using addi-
tional independent variables or collecting more data, we cannot correct 
for this problem.78  With this qualification in mind, the initial indications 
from the data are that neither the monitoring nor the collegiality hy-
potheses find much support. 
TABLE 4 
Logit estimates Number of obs = 117 
Log pseudo-likelihood = -49.7556 Pseudo R2 = 0.0414 
 Coef. Robust  
Std. Er-
ror 
z P>|z| [95% Conf. Inter-
val] 
LAWYERS .0003985   .0007504   0.53   0.595   -.0010723    
.0018693 
OFFICES .0283613   .0524437   0.54   0.589   -.0744265    
.1311491 
GROWTH .0011623     .01928     0.06   0.952   -.0366258    
.0389503 
FOREIGN -1.748595    .9146515 -1.91   0.056   -3.541279    
.0440886 
CONST 1.566562     .3697773 4.24 0.000    .8418118    
2.291312 
The logit results are based on a relatively small number of firms, an 
unavoidable problem for this population.  Although we collected data on 
all New York City firms listed in Martindale-Hubble and NALP with 
more than twenty-five lawyers, rather than drawing a sample of such 
firms, this is, nonetheless, still a limited number of observations.79 
As an additional check on the robustness of the significance results, 
we bootstrapped the sample, a process that involves resampling from the 
data.  The computational technique randomly draws with replacement a 
 
all variables were insignificant.  In a provocative new working paper, Eric Talley and John Romley 
conduct a nationwide inquiry into law firm choice of form.  Romley & Talley, supra note 47.  They find 
that a firm’s size—measured in terms of the number of lawyers in 1993—is a statistically significant 
predictor of the law firm’s choice of organizational form as of 1999.  Id. at 31–32 & tbl.11. 
 78. Dropping one of the correlated variables is a common but incorrect fix for multicollinearity.  
See PETER KENNEDY, A GUIDE TO ECONOMETRICS 182 (4th ed. 1992).  Because this incorrect correc-
tion is frequently used, however, we also ran two additional models.  In the first model, we dropped 
LAWYERS as an independent variable, but kept OFFICES.  In the second model, we dropped 
OFFICES, and kept LAWYERS.  Neither OFFICES nor LAWYERS was significant when run with-
out the presence of the other in the regression.  In addition, we tested the joint significance of 
OFFICES and LAWYERS.  We could not reject the hypothesis that the coefficients on both variables 
equal zero. 
 79. Some firms, especially smaller firms, may choose not to list in Martindale-Hubble or NALP, 
because such listing involves a fee.  So, while we are confident that our dataset includes most New 
York law firms, the data set may not include all New York firms.  This potential selection bias among 
smaller firms is one reason that we did not include in our sample firms with fewer than twenty-five 
lawyers. 
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new sample from the data at hand.80  The logit model is then run on each 
of the bootstrapped samples.81 
Because bootstrapping resamples from the same data, it is only ap-
propriate when certain assumptions are met.  Specifically, 
We must be prepared to assume that the empirical distribution 
function represented by the sample is a good estimator of the popu-
lation distribution function that generated the sample in the first 
place.  That is, we must believe that a representative sample of all 
possible distinct values of the population is found in our data.82 
We believe that our dataset meets this assumption because of the 
method of data collection.  As previously noted, our dataset represents 
the entire population of New York City firms with more than twenty-five 
lawyers, as reported by Martindale-Hubble and NALP.83 
Table 5 summarizes the bootstrapping results.  The coefficients on 
GROWTH, LAWYER, and OFFICE are insignificant for all three 
methods for constructing bootstrap confidence intervals.84  The coeffi-
cient on FOREIGN was insignificant for two of the methods for con-
structing intervals and significant for one of the methods.85 
TABLE 5 
bootstrap statistics Number of obs = 117 
Replications = 1000 
Variable Reps Observed Bias Std. Err. [95% Conf. Interval] 
B_LAWYERS 1000   .0003985     -.00004    .0015948    -.002731     .0035279  (N) 
-.0031016   .0037558  (P) 
-.0030128   .004021   (BC) 
B_OFFICES 1000   .0283613    .0253877 .0859417       -.1402856   .1970082   (N) 
-.0809225   .2596718   (P) 
-.1091741   .1871728 (BC) 
B_GROWTH 1000      .0011623    .0054339 .0309361 -.0595449   .0618694   (N) 
-.0491735   .0783014   (P) 
-.0584999   .0620802 (BC) 
B_FOREIGN 947 -1.74859      -.22967 1.334121 -4.366775   .8695839   (N) 
-4.961497  -.0081233   (P) 
-4.125079    .086775  (BC) 
 
(Continued on next page) 
 
 80. See CHRISTOPHER Z. MOONEY & ROBERT D. DUVAL, BOOTSTRAPPING: A 
NONPARAMETRIC APPROACH TO STATISTICAL INFERENCE 9–15 (1993) (describing how bootstrapping 
works generally). 
 81. Bootstrapping is useful in developing confidence intervals.  Id. at 60.  However, the parame-
ter estimates from bootstrapping are unreliable, a problem that does not concern us here, as we are 
concerned only with the significance of the results.  Id. 
 82. Id. at 60–61 (emphasis added). 
 83. See supra note 79 (discussing the dataset). 
 84. See MOONEY & DUVAL, supra note 80, at 33–42 (describing the different ways to construct 
bootstrap confidence intervals). 
 85. The replication for FOREIGN only occurred 947 times.  This means that in fifty-three of the 
resamples, the sampling did not draw any foreign firms, making it impossible to run the logit on those 
resamples. 
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TABLE 5—Continued 
B_CONST 1000           1.566562    -.048501 .4290887   .7245433     2.408581   (N) 
.7236955     2.400121    (P) 
.8607135     2.549127 (BC) 
Finally, as an additional test of the collegiality hypothesis, we esti-
mated a logit model for the subset of fifty-three firms for which data on 
both COLLEGIAL and TIER was available.  Table 6 reports the logit 
results from this subsample.  As with the other models, the coefficients 
on all variables were statistically insignificant. 
TABLE 6 
Logit estimates Number of obs = 53 
Log pseudo-likelihood = -19.406266 Pseudo R2 = 0.0619 
 Coef. Robust 
Std.  
Error 
z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
LAWYERS .0002044 .0007751   .26 0.792 -.0013147    .0017236 
OFFICES .0511103 .0785404  0.65 0.515   -.1028261    .2050466 
GROWTH -.0692595 .0474476 -1.46 0.144 -.1622552    .0237361 
FOREIGN -1.390741 1.368034 -1.02 0.309   -4.07204      1.290557 
COLLEGIAL  .2180422 .8244907  0.26 0.791   -1.39793      1.834014 
TIER -.002586 1.052599 -0.00 0.998   -2.065643    2.060471 
CONST 1.979628 .7010438  2.82 0.005     .6056078     3.353649 
However, one cannot make a strong inference from the results in 
Table 6.  The sample size is too small, making heavy reliance on the re-
sults unjustifiable.86 
ii. Section Summary 
To summarize this subsection, given the results on the entire sam-
ple, the bootstrapping results, and the preliminary results on firms re-
porting TIER and COLLEGIAL information, the indications from the 
data are that neither the monitoring nor the collegiality hypotheses find 
much support in the data.  Although the coefficient on FOREIGN was 
insignificant, except in one method for constructing intervals in the boot-
strapping results, three out of eight foreign firms were GPs, a much 
higher proportion of GPs than in the total sample.  Although we hesitate 
to read too much into this result because of the small number of foreign 
firms in the sample, our interview results provide some insight into why 
the filing patterns among foreign firms, especially U.K. firms, may differ 
from the filing patterns of domestic firms. 
 
 86. We also bootstrapped this smaller sample.  The coefficients on all variables were insignificant 
when bootstrapped.  However, we are not confident about these results because the smaller sample 
may not be representative of the population under study.  See id. at 60–61 (discussing the limitations of 
the bootstrap technique). 
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For most law firms based outside of the United States, the New 
York office represents a relatively small percentage of the total partner-
ship.  Accordingly, were the firm to seek liability protection, most would 
prefer another avenue, such as filing as a limited liability entity in their 
own country, to accomplish it.87  Although many jurisdictions have re-
cently modernized their limited liability laws available to professional as-
sociations, making them more attractive, there are still impediments to 
limited liability in many jurisdictions.88  Accordingly, although many 
large law firms based outside of the United States are currently consider-
ing the issue of becoming a limited liability entity, and many of our inter-
view subjects predicted that all of the major international firms based 
outside of the United States would soon follow the lead of the domestic 
firms, these practical impediments have slowed the process among many 
foreign firms.89 
c. The Relationship Between Profits and Choice of Form 
Recall that the unlimited liability version of the monitoring theory 
suggests that, because LLPs provide an inferior legal product, they must 
either (1) charge less, or (2) suffer reduced revenues.  As discussed below 
in Part IV, our interview data allow us to reject the first possibility.  This 
subsection considers the second possibility, investigating the link be-
tween choice of organizational form and profits-per-partner. 
As noted previously, we collected profit per partner data for the 
years 1993–2003 on the thirty-six firms in our sample that were listed 
among the 200 most profitable in the country. The goal of this section is 
to determine whether a switch in form from a GP to an LLP had any ef-
fect on firm profitability.  This is a panel data set, in which we observe 
the same firms over a ten-year span.  During this span, thirty-one firms 
changed from a GP to an LLP; five firms remained GPs. 
To determine whether a change of form had any effect on profits, 
we ran a fixed effects model that accounts for unobservable firm-specific 
traits and secular trends, both of which—if unaccounted for—might af-
 
 87. Confidential interview with senior partner at foreign law firm in London, England (July 12, 
2004) (interview notes on file with the authors). 
 88. For example, U.K. law firms that choose to limit their liability must make their financial 
statements publicly available, a requirement that has caused many U.K. firms to forgo the benefit of 
the statute.  Confidential interview with senior partner at foreign law firm in London, England (July 
12, 2004) (interview notes on file with the authors).  In addition, law firms with a substantial German 
practice must contend with German tax laws that deem partnership goodwill recognized if the firm 
changes its organizational form.  Although it is apparently possible to get a firm-specific ruling waiving 
the statute, the ease and speed with which this occurs varies by jurisdiction.  Id. 
 89. One of the U.K.’s leading law firms, Allen & Overy, recently became a U.K. LLP effective 
on May 1, 2004.  Many predict that other major UK firms will soon follow suit.  See Bob Sherwood, A 
Question of Protection: Limited Liability, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2004, at 11. 
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fect profitability.90  The independent variables include dummy variables 
for the filing date and the lags of the filing date. 
The variable, FILING, equals one if the firm filed for LLP status in 
that year and zero otherwise.  The variable, FILLAG1, equals one if the 
firm filed as an LLP in the previous year and zero otherwise.  The re-
maining variables, FILAG2, FILAG3, FILAG4, FILAG5, FILAG6, 
FILAG7, FILAG8, are defined in a similar fashion.  These lags of the fil-
ing date allowed us to examine whether the switch in form had a persis-
tent and/or delayed impact on profits. 
Tables 7 and 8 summarize the results.  The dependent variable in 
Table 7 is the level of profits.  The dependent variable in Table 8 is the 
log of profits.  The log function compresses the profit data, reducing the 
impact of outliers on the results.91  In both tables, we suppress the esti-
mates on the time dummy variables, which account for the secular trends.  
As Table 7 reports, many of the filing variables are statistically significant 
and negative.  One must be careful, however, in interpreting the point 
estimates.  Take, for instance, the estimate on FILAG6, which is -
184,515.5.  Roughly speaking, this means that, all else being equal, a firm 
that files for LLP status in 1997 will have $184,515.50 less profits in 2003. 
In Table 8, none of the filing variables is statistically significant and 
the point estimates flip signs, starting negative and turning positive as the 
length of the lag increases.92  The results in Table 8 caution us against 
reading too much into the results from Table 7.93  Given the results in 
Table 7, however, we cannot completely dismiss the possibility that a 
switch in form from a GP to an LLP reduces profitability, at least in the 
first few years. 
TABLE 7 
Regression with robust standard errors Number of obs = 344 
 R-squared = 0.9147 
 Adj R-squared =  0.8987 
 (standard errors adjusted for clustering on firm) 
 firm absorbed (36 categories) 
Robust profits Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
FILING -21258.85 44453.78 -0.48 0.633 -108753.1    66235.37 
FILAG1 -87008.55 66094.87 -1.32 0.189 -217096.9     43079.8 
(Continued on next page) 
 
 90. For a nontechnical discussion of the fixed effects model, see JEFFREY M. WOOLDRIDGE, 
INTRODUCTORY ECONOMETRICS: A MODERN APPROACH 461–69 (2d ed. 2003). 
 91. See infra note 96 (discussing the effect of the log function). 
 92. When the dependant variable is the log of profits, the coefficient estimates represent the per-
centage change in profits.  So, for example, in Table 8, the estimate on FILAG2 equals -.09.  This 
means, all else equal, a switch in form from a GP to an LLP in 1999 leads to nine percent less profits in 
2001. 
 93. The results from Table 7 do not seem to be the result of outliers.  We reran the model with 
profit levels as the dependant variable, but dropped the firms that had the three highest profits per 
partner and the three lowest profits per partner in 2003.  The same results occur:  The filing date coef-
ficients are all negative and many of the lag variables are statistically significant. 
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TABLE 7—Continued 
Robust profits Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
1FILAG2 -174411.4 84025.32 -2.08 0.039 -339790.6   -9032.259 
FILAG3 -187735.9 101827.9 -1.84 0.066 -388154.2    12682.44 
FILAG4 -159628.4 94619.01 -1.69 0.093 -345858.1    26601.35 
FILAG5 -188473.5 81811.78 -2.30 0.022 -349495.9   -27450.98 
FILAG6 -184515.5 80088.32 -2.30 0.022 -342145.8   -26885.14 
FILAG7 -150712.8 88654.57 -1.70 0.090 -325203.3    23777.66 
FILAG8 -162935.3 85871.46 -1.90 0.059 -331948    6077.454 
_CONS 602822.1 40466.9 14.90 0.000 523174.9    682469.3 
TABLE 8 
Regression with robust standard errors Number of obs = 344 
 R-squared = 0.9469 
 Adj R-squared =  0.9370 
(standard errors adjusted for clustering on firm) 
firm | absorbed (36 categories) 
ln_profits Robust 
Coef. 
Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
FILING -.0093797 .0432447 -0.22 0.828 -.0944943    .0757348 
FILAG1 -.0534657 .0582221 -0.92 0.359 -.1680588    .0611273 
FILAG2 -.0919802 .0692698 -1.33 0.185 -.2283174     .044357 
FILAG3 -.038596 .0662408 -0.58 0.561 -.1689716    .0917795 
FILAG4   .04744 .0734623   0.65 0.519 -.0971489     .192029 
FILAG5   .0593914 .0647471   0.92 0.360 -.0680443    .1868272 
FILAG6   .0809359 .0774825   1.04 0.297 -.0715656    .2334375 
FILAG7   .1255982 .0885678   1.42 0.157 -.0487215     .299918 
FILAG8   .109464 .0799982   1.37 0.172 -.047989    .2669169 
CONST   13.23817 .0368891   358.86   0.000      13.16556    13.31077 
d. Unlimited Liability and Signaling 
As discussed in Part II.D.1 of this article, unlimited liability is 
thought to send a positive signal to customers by indicating that, because 
each partner’s personal assets are at stake in the event of her own or an-
other partner’s blunder, each partner will take more care in the provision 
of legal services and will more carefully monitor other firm members.  
Because the quality signaling theory depends on information asymmetry 
between the firm and its clients, the signaling theory suggests that firms 
whose clients possess less information regarding the quality of legal ser-
vices they receive should have a greater need to engage in this type of 
quality signaling than firms whose clients are well informed regarding the 
quality of legal services. 
To test this hypothesis, we predicted a positive, significant relation-
ship between each of IN-HOUSE-AVG, IN-HOUSE-TOTAL, and 
FORTUNE on the probability that a firm is an LLP. Tables 9 and 10 re-
port the results on signaling.  In Table 9, FORM again serves as the dis-
crete dependent variable.  The independent variables include 
GROWTH, OFFICES, and FOREIGN, plus FORTUNE.  The coeffi-
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cients on LAWYERS, OFFICES, and FORTUNE are all insignificant.94  
However, the coefficient on FOREIGN was significant in this model.95 
TABLE 9 
Logit estimates Number of obs = 117 
Log pseudo-likelihood = -47.700453 Pseudo R2 = 0.0810 
 Coef. Robust  
Std. Error 
z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
LAWYERS .003625         .0029158 1.24    0.214     -.0020897    .0093398 
OFFICES -.0196299        .063816      -0.31    0.758     -.144707      .1054471   
GROWTH -.0016844       .0195909 -0.09    0.931     -.0400818    .0367131     
FOREIGN -2.266825         1.073779 -2.11  0.035     -4.371393   -.1622578 
FORTUNE -.2088203        .1224337 -1.71    0.088       -.4487859    .0311453         
CONST  1.638935        .4037346 4.06    0.000       .8476294      2.43024 
Table 10 summarizes the results from the last logit model.  The 
sample for this model contains only thirty-nine observations and, hence, 
the results are suggestive at best.  The sample includes only those firms 
who represent clients in the Fortune 250.  In this model, we add as an in-
dependent variable the log of the average number of in house counsel 
(IN-HOUSE-AVG) and the total number of in-house counsel (IN-
HOUSE-TOTAL).96  The coefficients on all variables are statistically in-
significant.97 
In contrast to the statistical tests of the other theories, the data here 
is weaker.  As a result, our conclusion is more tentative.  The proxies for 
information asymmetry are just that—proxies.98  That said, when com-
 
 94. We also ran a model with whether the firm had any clients in the Fortune 250 as a dummy 
variable.  In this model as well, all the coefficients were statistically insignificant. 
 95. Although we hesitate to read too much into this result because the data set includes so few 
foreign firms, the proportion of foreign firms that are GPs is much higher than in the total sample, and 
our interview results indicate that foreign firms face different issues concerning the choice of organiza-
tional form than do domestic firms.  See supra notes 88–89 and accompanying text (discussing the for-
eign firms). 
 96. The log is used because the figures on the average number of in-house counsel are skewed.  
The log operator minimizes the impact of this dispersion.  Consider an example:  Shearman & Sterling 
represents six companies among the Fortune 250 with an average number of in-house counsel of 438.  
Morrison & Cohen represents one company with an in-house counsel office of seventeen people.  Us-
ing just the average number of in-house counsel implies that the information asymmetry between 
Shearman and its clients is twenty-five times less than the information asymmetry between Morrison 
& Cohen and its clients.  This result seems unreasonable, and the log operator minimizes this differ-
ence.  See Steve Choi & Mitu Gulati, Choosing the Next Supreme Court Justice: An Empirical Ranking 
of Judicial Performance, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 23, 72 (2004) (noting that the “use of the log transforma-
tion . . . helps reduce the skewness in the distribution due to the superstar effect (resulting in a more 
normal distribution . . . )”). 
 97. FOREIGN does not appear in this table because, for the firms in this small dataset, 
FOREIGN perfectly predicted the choice of form.  As a result, the logit model could not run with 
FOREIGN. 
 98. In addition, if information asymmetry causes firms to remain a GP and information asymme-
try causes clients to increase the number of in-house counsel, then there is a simultaneity problem.  In 
this case, treating the number of in-house counsel as an exogenous variable will lead to incorrect re-
sults.  See GREENE, supra note 77, at 652–53.  We thank Allen Ferrell for bringing this fact to our at-
tention. 
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bined with insights from our interview data, the data suggest that firms 
are not retaining unlimited liability to signal quality to the market. 
TABLE 10 
Logit estimates Number of obs = 39 
 Wald chi2(5) = 4.58 
 Prob > chi2 = 0.4694 
Log pseudo-likelihood = -14.783085 Pseudo R2 = 0.1171 
FORM Coef. 
Robust 
Std. Error z P>z [95% Conf.    Interval] 
LAWYERS .000452 .0028821 0.16 0.875 -.0051969    .0061009 
OFFICES .1687124 .1009903 1.67 0.095 -.029225    .3666499 
GROWTH -.1049959 .0865421 -1.21 0.225 -.2746154    .0646235 
INHOUSE 
AVG 
-.5037849 .6437803 -0.78 0.434 -1.765571    .7580012 
INHOUSE 
TOTAL 
-.0007108 .0008888 -0.80 0.424 -.0024528    .0010312 
_CONS 4.365533 3.190948 1.37 0.171 -1.888609    10.61968 
4. Testing the Theories Revisited—A Duration Analysis 
a. Motivation for the Duration Analysis 
The duration model is a time event study that measures the time 
that has elapsed before a certain event occurs.99  Unlike the logit model, 
which analyzes a firm’s choice of form at a particular moment in time, 
the duration model permits an analysis of choice of form as it changes 
over time.  In other words, whereas the logit model asks whether there 
are significant differences between firms that are GPs and firms that are 
LLPs, the duration model asks whether there are significant differences 
in the speed with which firms with certain characteristics became LLPs.  
Unlike the logit model, the duration model thus allows us to examine 
whether the length of time it takes a firm to switch from the GP to LLP 
form correlates with the variables that economists predict are important 
in determining the choice of form.  Did, for example, larger firms or 
more geographically dispersed firms adopt LLP status more quickly than 
small firms with only one office?  This question can only be answered by 
looking at the firms over time. 
The duration model provides two other benefits as well.  First, the 
logit models discussed above may suffer from a problem of endogeneity.  
The logit model assumes, for example, that the number of lawyers is ex-
ogenous.  In other words, it assumes that the number of lawyers is not in-
fluenced by the choice of form. 
 
 99. For complete and more technical treatments of the duration model, see JEFFREY M. 
WOOLDRIDGE, ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS OF CROSS SECTION AND PANEL DATA 685–715 (2002); 
Nicholas M. Kiefer, Economic Duration Data and Hazard Functions, 26 J. ECON. LITERATURE 646 
(1988). 
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As noted above, the hypothesis we would like to test is that the 
number of lawyers in the firm significantly impacts the probability that 
the firm will limit its liability.100  However, it is also possible that the 
firm’s choice of form determines the number of lawyers.  In other words, 
an LLP may have more lawyers precisely because it has limited its liabil-
ity.  If this is the case, then it is the choice of form that drives the number 
of lawyers, rather than the other way around as hypothesized.  This same 
type of endogeneity problem is possible with the variables OFFICE, 
GROWTH, and FOREIGN as well, rendering the logit estimates poten-
tially unreliable. 
To address this problem, we gathered data on the number of offices 
and the number of lawyers from 1994 to 2003.  Next, we used the fact 
that each firm filed for LLP status on a different date to control for en-
dogeneity. 
To see how this works, consider Skadden Arps Slate Meagher & 
Flom LLP.  Skadden filed for LLP status on May 25, 2001.  The duration 
analysis asks whether the number of lawyers at Skadden in any one year 
influences the probability that Skadden files for LLP status in that same 
year, assuming that Skadden had not filed for LLP status up to that point 
in time.  The number of lawyers at Skadden after the filing date thus 
plays no role in the analysis, as the duration analysis ends with the filing 
date.  The temporal nature of the analysis mitigates the chance of en-
dogeneity.  In contrast to the logit model (which is based on a snapshot 
of firm characteristics), endogeneity will be a problem in the duration 
model only if the firm adds or subtracts lawyers in anticipation of the 
switch in form.101 
The final benefit of the duration model relates to sample size.  Al-
though we collected data on every New York law firm listed in Martin-
dale-Hubble as having twenty-five or more lawyers, the logit models are 
based on a small sample size.  The duration analysis takes the same small 
sample and expands it by looking at each firm over a ten-year period.  
This increase in the sample size gives us more confidence in the results. 
b. Description of Methodology 
i. The Duration Model 
The duration model originated in medical studies in which re-
searchers desired to study the length of time a patient survives after a 
particular treatment.102  For this reason, the duration model is sometimes 
referred to as a survival model.  In a duration model, the key variable is 
 
 100. For reasons discussed supra note 23, we did not predict whether this impact would be posi-
tive or negative. 
 101. MARIO A. CLEVES ET AL., AN INTRODUCTION TO SURVIVAL ANALYSIS USING STATA 166 
(2004) (noting that, in duration analysis, “researchers often ignore anticipation or delay effects”). 
 102. WOOLDRIDGE, supra note 99, at 685. 
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the hazard rate.  The hazard rate is the probability that the event of in-
terest occurs, given that the event has not occurred up to that point in 
time.103 
To see this more clearly, consider an economic problem that has 
been subject to duration analysis:  unemployment.104  In a duration analy-
sis of unemployment, the event of interest is finding a job.  The hazard 
rate for a particular week is the probability the person finds employment 
that week, given that the same individual has been unemployed for the 
previous weeks.  One policy issue is how unemployment benefits affect 
the hazard rate.105  If unemployment benefits decrease the hazard rate, 
this means that more benefits increase the chance of continued unem-
ployment. 
In this same context, a researcher might be interested in whether 
certain characteristics of the unemployed person influence the hazard 
rate, for example, whether the person is male or female.  These sorts of 
characteristics are called covariates.  Some covariates change over time.  
Unsurprisingly, these covariates are called time-varying covariates.  In 
the unemployment context, an example of a time-varying covariate is 
underlying economic conditions. 
ii. Application to the Choice of Organizational Form 
In our model, the event of interest is the switch from the GP form to 
the LLP form.  Our covariates are the number of lawyers and the num-
ber of offices in any year and whether the firm is a foreign or domestic 
firm, as we are interested in whether these characteristics impact the 
probability that the firm switches form, given that it had not switched 
form before.  Based on the economic theories discussed above in Part II, 
we would predict that a firm’s number of lawyers and number of offices 
will impact the speed with which the firm switches form.  That is, the 
hazard rate (the probability of switching to the LLP form at a specific 
moment, conditional on the firm not switching up to that point) will 
change with the number of lawyers and the number of offices.  Both 
OFFICES and LAWYERS are time-varying covariates in the analysis.  
FOREIGN, by contrast, is a constant covariate. 
iii. Results 
The starting date of the study is 1994—the year that New York’s 
LLP statute became effective.  Although the model is based on 110 firms, 
 
 103. See Kiefer, supra note 99, at 649. 
 104. For an early study of this sort, see Tony Lancaster, Econometric Methods for the Duration of 
Unemployment, 47 ECONOMETRICA 939 (1979). 
 105. See Gerard J. van den Berg, Search Behaviour: Transitions to Non-Participation and the Du-
ration of Unemployment, 100 ECON. J. 842, 855–56 (1990) (discussing unemployment benefits as a pol-
icy lever). 
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only 90 firms switched from the GP form to the LLP form during the 
course of the study.106 
Each firm has multiple observations.  For example, we observe the 
number of lawyers and the number of offices for Kelley Drye & Warren 
LLP in 1994, 1995, and 1996.  We discarded all observations after Kelly 
switched form in 1996, and, in effect, exited the study. 
We used the Cox method for estimating the model.107  For ease of 
interpretation, the estimates on LAWYERS, OFFICES, and FOREIGN 
are reported as hazard ratios.  Hazard ratios have a simple interpreta-
tion.  If the hazard ratio equals two, this means that a one-unit increase 
in the covariate increases the hazard rate by 100%.108  So, for example, if 
the number of lawyers increases by one and the estimated hazard ratio is 
two, this means that, at any point in time, a law firm with 200 lawyers has 
twice the conditional probability of adopting LLP status as a law firm 
with 199 lawyers.109  If the hazard ratio equals one, a one-unit increase in 
the covariate of interest has no impact on the hazard rate. 
Table 11 reports the results.  We cannot reject the hypothesis that 
LAWYERS and OFFICES have no effect on the probability of a switch 
in form from a GP to an LLP (i.e., that the hazard ratio for each of these 
variables is equal to one.)  In other words, we cannot reject the possibil-
ity that, contrary to theory, the number of lawyers and the number of of-
fices play no role in a law firm’s decision to limit its liability.  This finding 
provides another check and adds robustness to the logit model findings 
presented above. 
TABLE 11 
Cox regression—Breslow method for ties 
No. of subjects = 111 Number of obs  =  585 
No. of failures =  90 
Log likelihood = -371.20846    
 Haz. Ratio Std. Error z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
LAWYERS .9997929        .0007201 -0.29     0.774        .9983825    1.001205     
OFFICES 1.024761         .0359544 0.70     0.486        .95666     1.09771 
FOREIGN .6540692       .340994   -0.81    0.415      .235427    1.817152 
 
 106. The model is based on only 110 firms, not 118, because complete data were unavailable for 
eight firms. 
 107. The Cox model assumes that the “covariates multiplicatively shift the baseline hazard func-
tion.”  See CLEVES ET AL., supra note 101, at 121.  The baseline hazard function is the hazard function 
when all the covariates equal zero.  Id.  The Cox method is a common way to estimate a duration 
model.  We also estimated the effects using various other models, which make assumptions about the 
distribution of the hazard function.  These models include, for example, the exponential and Weibull 
models.  Id. at 213–50.  Neither LAWYERS nor OFFICES was significant in any formulation of the 
model. 
 108. For a more detailed discussion of hazard ratios, see id. at 122–27. 
 109. We also did the same analysis but changed the units on lawyers.  With the changed units, a 
one-unit increase meant an increase of ten lawyers at the firm.  Under this modification, we could not 
reject the possibility that the hazard ratio equals one. 
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IV. INTERVIEW DATA 
We sought clarification and confirmation of the implications of our 
empirical results through a series of interviews with individuals active in 
and knowledgeable about the choice of organizational form by New 
York law firms.  Specifically, we interviewed:  (1) partners at law firms in 
our sample who had been involved in their firm’s decision regarding or-
ganizational form; (2) legal consultants, who advise law firms on a variety 
of matters, including the choice of organizational form; and (3) insurers, 
who base malpractice liability insurance rates on a variety of factors 
thought to correlate with the probability of a malpractice judgment and, 
thus, collect data from law firms regarding those factors.110 
A. Law Firm Partners 
1. Methodology 
In order to shed light on the results of our empirical analysis, we in-
terviewed partners at many of the law firms in our sample.  We inter-
viewed partners at many firms across a range of sizes and practice areas 
that had opted for LLP status.  More importantly, we interviewed at least 
one partner at every law firm in our sample with more than fifty lawyers 
that had chosen to remain a GP.  To add depth and understanding to our 
analysis, we also interviewed a limited number of in-house counsel and 
partners at law firms that are not in our sample, but that we felt were suf-
ficiently similar to our sample of firms to provide useful information con-
cerning issues relating to the choice of organizational form by firms in 
our sample.111  In total, we interviewed seventy-five partners at sixty 
firms. 
Interviewees were encouraged to freely discuss the choice of organ-
izational form at their firm, without prompting or leading from the inter-
viewer.  When necessary, interviewees were prompted to discuss particu-
lar issues of interest to the authors through a list of questions.  The list of 
questions designed for GP partners is attached to this article as Appen-
dix E.  The list of questions designed for LLP partners is attached to this 
article as Appendix F. 
 
 110. All interview subjects were ensured confidentiality and are not identified by name or firm 
name in this article.  For purposes of verifiability, redacted interview notes are available from the au-
thors. 
 111. As an example, one large foreign firm whose main domestic office is in New York did not 
appear in our sample due to a quirk in the method by which the firm lists with Martindale-Hubble.  
We felt that partners at this firm faced issues regarding the choice of organizational form sufficiently 
similar to those faced by firms in our sample to provide useful information. 
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2. Findings 
Although the explanations offered for the choice to remain a GP 
vary across firms and law firm cultures are undoubtedly idiosyncratic, 
several general themes arose from our discussions with law firm partners.  
First, neither apathy nor lack of attention to the costs and benefits of 
LLP status seem to explain the choice of organizational form in any of 
the firms in our sample.  Second, the most frequently cited issues that 
arose in connection with the LLP debate at most firms were:  concerns 
over lost collegiality, concerns over the perceived negative signal to cli-
ents associated with limited liability, whether a sufficient number of the 
filing firm’s peer firms had filed, the “Arthur Andersen effect,” and the 
connection between limited liability and lock-step compensation.  In ad-
dition, nearly every partner that we interviewed indicated a belief that 
the ultimate movement of law firms to limited liability forms was inevita-
ble.  This was true even among partners at firms that had decided to re-
main a GP, at least temporarily. 
Third, intra-firm economics had caused a handful of firms to strug-
gle with the move to a limited liability entity, although each of those 
firms was eventually able to overcome that struggle and file for LLP 
status.  Finally, some law firm partners cited the size, decentralization, 
and specialization of modern law firms as relevant factors motivating the 
decision to become an LLP. 
a. Ruling Out Apathy and Lack of Sophistication 
It is worth noting at the outset that neither lack of sophistication, 
failure to appreciate the costs and benefits of limited liability, nor simple 
apathy can explain the lack of movement into LLPs by those New York 
law firms that remain a GP.  As is evident from the many large and suc-
cessful firms listed in Appendix A as a GP, partners at the GP firms are 
quite sophisticated.  Our interview data reveal that, in these firms, the 
partners have debated (and rejected) LLP status.  The existence of the 
debate reveals that:  (1) partners know about LLP status, and (2) the 
LLP is not the preferred choice for every partner.  At least some partners 
perceive costs as well as benefits to the LLP form. 
This is not to imply that the conversion to a limited liability entity 
entails no transaction costs for law firms.  Simply garnering agreement 
from, in some cases, hundreds of busy and opinionated law firm partners 
doubtless can be difficult.  However, in almost every case the reason for 
this difficulty stems from the fact that many law firm partners perceive 
real costs to the conversion to an LLP form, as discussed throughout this 
Part IV. 
KRAWIEC.DOC 6/20/2005  10:42 AM 
146 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2005 
In addition, some firms did attribute their slow movement to the 
LLP form to the fact that limiting liability “simply was not a priority” for 
the firm.112  However, at every firm we spoke to, this view changed sub-
stantially after the Arthur Andersen bankruptcy, as discussed in more 
detail in Part IV.A.2.e. 
b. Collegiality 
Every partner we interviewed identified fears regarding a loss in 
firm collegiality as an issue that arose in their firms’ debates over 
whether to become an LLP.113  When pressed to describe exactly what 
was meant by a loss of collegiality, it became clear that “collegiality” 
takes on several different meanings. 
For some partners, particularly older partners, a loss of collegiality 
resembled a form of nostalgia.  These partners often lamented the in-
creasing commercialization of law practice and yearned for the days 
when all partners knew and trusted each other and all clients knew and 
trusted their legal counsel. 
At other firms, concerns over lost collegiality took on a decidedly 
economic cast.  A commonly asserted fear was that partners would hesi-
tate to advise fellow partners or pitch in on matters if doing so would 
create additional liability risk.  A handful of partners at firms that had 
become LLPs believed that this fear had been well-founded at their firm 
and that certain partners now avoided helping out on other partners’ 
projects, out of a desire to limit their personal exposure.114  Most part-
ners, however, indicated that becoming an LLP had not impacted in any 
way the relations among partners.  As stated by one law firm partner, 
“Partners who were uncollegial before [the firm became an LLP] are still 
uncollegial and partners who were collegial before are still just as colle-
gial [after the firm became an LLP].”115 
c. Signaling 
Our interviews with law firm partners revealed that, at nearly every 
firm, partners feared the negative signal that any limitation on personal 
liability might send to their clients and competitors.  This fact was par-
ticularly true when very few of the firm’s competitor firms had opted to 
limit their liability.  As stated by one law firm partner, “At the time we 
 
 112. Confidential interview with law firm partner in New York, N.Y. (July 13, 2004) (interview 
notes on file with authors). 
 113. Confidential interviews with law firm partners (interview notes on file with authors); see also 
Anthony Lin, After Enron, Firms Rethink Partnership, 227 N.Y. L.J. 1, 1 (2002) (quoting an unnamed 
partner at a major New York law firm as stating that his firm deadlocked over the decision of whether 
to become an LLP because of the “tremendous fear that the partnership would lose its collegiality”). 
 114. Confidential interviews with law firm partners (interview notes on file with authors). 
 115. Confidential interview with law firm partner in New York, N.Y. (July 12, 2004) (interview 
notes on file with authors). 
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first debated becoming an LLP, none of the firms that we consider simi-
lar to us had limited their liability.  We didn’t want to be path breakers 
on this.”116 
At the same time, as more firms within a given cohort opt for LLP 
status, the perceived negative signal associated with limited liability di-
minishes, and the arguments in favor of limited liability are more persua-
sive.  As stated by one partner, “We’re currently reconsidering the issue 
and my prediction is that we’ll switch [to an LLP] at some point in the 
near future.  Now that most of the other firms like us have switched, the 
arguments against it seem weaker.”117 
Interestingly, it is not at all clear that this fear is well-founded.  
Every LLP partner that we spoke to believed that the firm’s relations 
with clients had not been altered by the decision to become an LLP. 
d. The Importance of Cohorts 
Our interview data reveal that law firms are extraordinarily conser-
vative and are reluctant to take actions that may distinguish them in a 
negative manner from their competitor firms.  This fact is especially true 
of the large, elite law firms that we interviewed.  For those firms who 
were slow to file for LLP status (as noted, this is true of the majority of 
elite firms), one of the most commonly cited rationales for the firm’s 
hesitation in filing was the fact that the firm did not want to file until a 
sufficient number of peer firms had also decided to file.118  Similarly, in 
addition to the Arthur Andersen effect, the most commonly cited moti-
vation behind the eventual decision to file was the fact that a sufficient 
number of peer firms had finally determined to file.  Our interview data 
also reveal that law firm partners were in regular communication with 
peer firms about the decision to file and, in some cases, coordinated the 
timing of their filings.119 
e. The Arthur Andersen Effect 
In our interviews with partners at firms that had recently chosen to 
limit their liability or were currently considering whether to do so, one 
factor was mentioned repeatedly as being relevant to the firm’s decision:  
the demise of Arthur Andersen.120  This fact was especially true at large, 
 
 116. Confidential interview with law firm partner in New York, N.Y. (Mar. 17, 2004) (interview 
notes on file with authors). 
 117. Confidential interview with law firm partner in New York, N.Y. (June 2, 2004) (interview 
notes on file with authors). 
 118. Confidential interviews with law firm partners (interview notes on file with authors). 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id.; see also Lin, supra note 113, at 1 (noting that “[i]n light of the potentially crippling liabil-
ity faced by Arthur Andersen, Vinson & Elkins and Kirkland & Ellis for their roles in the collapse of 
Enron Corp., major law firms are considering again whether to form themselves into limited liability 
partnerships”). 
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elite law firms, many of whom only opted for LLP status after 2001.  Ap-
parently, for many of these firms, the threat of a liability judgment that 
exceeded the firm’s malpractice insurance seemed relatively remote.121  
Given the perceived losses associated with limited liability, many firms 
simply felt that the benefits of LLP status were insufficient to overcome 
the costs.122 
For many firms, however, this perception changed with the trial and 
subsequent bankruptcy of Arthur Andersen.  Suddenly, the possibility of 
a liability judgment that would not only exhaust the firm’s liability insur-
ance, but its partners’ personal assets as well, seemed very real.  Appar-
ently, the fact that a firm as large and reputable as Arthur Andersen 
could simply disintegrate was a sobering experience for many law firm 
partners, and one that changed their outlook on limited liability.  In fact, 
several partners asserted their belief that their firms never would have 
switched to an LLP had the Enron and Arthur Andersen debacles not 
occurred.123 
f. Ruling Out the Monitoring Theory 
Many, if not most, of the law firm partners with whom we spoke 
were familiar with the theory that placing each partner’s personal liabil-
ity at stake for the blunders of every partner induces more careful moni-
toring among partners.  However, law firm partners with whom we spoke 
tended to scoff at this theory of partnership form.  First, most partners 
cited the size, decentralization, and specialization of the modern law firm 
as a factor that prevented the effectiveness of such attempts to moni-
tor.124  In addition, many partners were offended by the notion that part-
ners fail to attempt such monitoring to the best of their ability absent the 
threat of full personal liability.125  As noted by most partners, the fear of 
a liability judgment so large that it wipes out the partnership’s assets and 
insurance is not the factor that motivates careful legal work and monitor-
ing of fellow partners and associates.  Instead, it is concern with main-
taining the firm’s reputation and maximizing the firm’s billable rates that 
motivates monitoring of partners by other partners.126 
 
 121. Confidential interviews with law firm partners (interview notes on file with authors); see also 
Lin, supra note 113 (quoting Ward Bower, a principal at the law firm consultancy Altman Weil, as 
saying that, prior to Enron, many law firms assumed that malpractice was an insurable risk, but that 
“[y]ou can’t insure against 10-figure liability”). 
 122. Confidential interviews with law firm partners (interview notes on file with authors). 
 123. Confidential interviews with law firm partners (interview notes on file with authors). 
 124. Confidential interviews with law firm partners (interview notes on file with authors); see also 
infra notes 131–33 and accompanying text (discussing size, decentralization, and specialization as im-
pacting the choice of organizational form). 
 125. Confidential interviews with law firm partners (interview notes on file with authors). 
 126. Id. 
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g. The Partnership Penalty 
Despite the ongoing debate within many law firms regarding the 
choice of organizational form, the interview data reveal a feeling among 
law firm partners that those partners pushing to remain a GP may some 
day lose the intra-firm debate.  At that time, the remaining GP firms—
like most of their competitors—will opt for a limited liability form of 
some sort. 
These statements, combined with the other interview data discussed 
in this Part IV, cause us to conclude in Part V.A of this article that, if the 
GP form continues to exist, it will not be as an organizational form vol-
untarily chosen by firm participants after weighing the costs and benefits.  
Instead, we predict that the only function of the GP form in the coming 
years will be as a penalty default rule that forces parties contemplating 
the formation of a business or professional enterprise to reveal relevant 
information to courts and interested third parties.  At the same time, 
however, the fact that many law firm partners have aggressively pushed 
to remain a GP indicates that, at least for many law firm partners, the 
benefits of unlimited liability are real, a phenomenon explored in sub-
parts b–d of this section. 
h. The Lock-Step Connection 
The decision to switch from a GP to an LLP seemed particularly 
difficult at firms that still practiced some version of lock-step compensa-
tion.  As noted both by partners at lock-step firms and by those that are 
not, the concept of differentiated personal liability is inconsistent with 
the foundational principal at a lock-step firm that all of the partners 
“sink or swim together.”127  In addition, because partners at a lock-step 
firm can only succeed if every other partner succeeds, a willingness to 
pitch in and help out partners on any project on which help is needed is 
especially valued.128 
i. Intra-Firm Economics 
Our interviews revealed that intra-firm economics had caused a 
handful of the law firms in our sample to struggle with the move to a lim-
ited liability vehicle, although in every case the firm was eventually able 
to overcome those issues and adopt the LLP form.  According to some 
partners we interviewed, problems with renegotiating the division of 
profits within the firm before moving to a limited liability entity caused 
negotiations over the move to LLP status to stall.129 
 
 127. Confidential interviews with law firm partners (interview notes on file with authors). 
 128. Confidential interviews with law firm partners (interview notes on file with authors); see also 
supra notes 113–15 and accompanying text (discussing firm collegiality). 
 129. Confidential interviews with law firm partners (interview notes on file with authors). 
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Although LLP law permits partners to use their old GP agreement 
without modification to govern their relationship once they become an 
LLP, at least some firms feel that modification is necessary.  This is be-
cause the GP form requires partners to share all profits and all liability 
risks, despite the fact that some partners are in high-risk, high-return 
practice areas.  Presumably, GP agreements are premised on the notion 
that such high-risk, high-return partners are willing to give up some por-
tion of those returns, in exchange for the opportunity to share the risk of 
personal liability with all firm partners. 
Once a firm adopts limited liability status, however, partners are no 
longer sharing the risk of personal liability for the acts of fellow partners.  
As such, some high-risk, high-return partners expect to receive a greater 
share of the division of firm profits if the firm becomes an LLP.  Debates 
over whether and how much more some partners would receive under an 
LLP form and how much other partners would, in turn, be forced to give 
up caused some law firms to struggle with the move to LLP form, in 
some cases for as long as a year or two.130 
j. Size, Specialization, and Decentralization 
Although neither LAWYERS nor OFFICES were significant pre-
dictors of the choice of organizational form in our logit regression,131 law 
firm partners frequently cite the increasing size, decentralization, and 
specialization of the modern law firm as a factor impacting the choice to 
limit the partners’ personal liability.132  To many partners, the notion that 
a trust and estate partner in Texas could or would more carefully moni-
tor a bankruptcy partner in New York simply because of personal liabil-
ity fears is absurd, given the realities of modern law firm life.133 
k. Summary 
As noted by law firm partners, no single factor is a determinant of 
the choice of organizational form.134  Instead, as stated by many partners, 
a “confluence” of events has dictated the decision.  Those events include 
the number of similarly situated firms that have chosen to become LLPs, 
 
 130. Confidential interviews with law firm partners (interview notes on file with authors); see also 
Lin, supra note 113, at 1 (quoting Kenneth J. Laverriere, a Sherman & Sterling partner involved in the 
organizational form decision, as stating that Sherman’s negotiations over the move to LLP status took 
several months or longer, in part because of concerns over the division of profits under the LLP struc-
ture when some partners were in high-risk, high-return practice areas). 
 131. See supra notes 77–78 and accompanying text. 
 132. Confidential interviews with law firm partners (interview notes on file with authors). 
 133. Confidential interviews with law firm partners (interview notes on file with authors); see also 
Richard C. Reuben, Added Protection, 80 A.B.A. J., 54, 56 (1994) (quoting Robert R. Keatinge, Chair 
of the ABA Business Law Section Partnership Committee’s Subcommittee on Limited Liability Com-
panies, as stating “[w]hen you think about it, there is nothing I as a tax lawyer can do that will protect 
against someone from another department within the firm screwing up a water law issue”). 
 134. Confidential interviews with law firm partners (interview notes on file with authors). 
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rising liability fears associated with Arthur Andersen, larger transaction 
sizes, more frequent malpractice awards, the failure of malpractice insur-
ance to keep pace with these risks, and the intricacies of internal firm 
economics and culture.135 
B. Law Firm Consultants 
Law firm consultants work for consultancy firms that advise law 
firms on a variety of matters relating to law firm structure, operation, and 
profitability, including the choice of organizational form.  Our interviews 
with law firm consultants reinforced the information gathered through 
interviews with law firm partners. 
C. Law Firm Insurers 
Insurance companies insure business and professional enterprises, 
including law firms, against a variety of risks, including the risk of liabil-
ity arising from legal advice rendered to clients.  In determining what 
rates to charge law firms for such insurance, insurance companies con-
sider a variety of factors that are thought to correlate with an increased 
risk of such liability. 
If the theories proposed by economists and legal scholars that assert 
that unlimited liability results in the provision of higher-quality legal ser-
vices are true, then insurance companies should charge GPs lower pre-
miums than LLPs, in order to reflect the decreased risk of liability among 
GP firms.136  In other words, if unlimited liability really causes partners to 
better monitor each other, then that reduced liability risk should be re-
flected in lower insurance rates. 
Our interviews with law firm insurers reveal that insurance compa-
nies do not consider organizational form in setting liability insurance 
premiums.137  This is supported by our interviews with law firm partners.  
Although not every partner we interviewed was familiar with the firm’s 
insurance rates, those who were indicated that the decision to become an 
LLP had been made after consultation with the firm’s insurance com-
 
 135. Id. 
 136. This is in contrast to theories such as signaling, which predict higher profitability but not a 
lower liability risk, and profit-sharing, which predicts higher per partner profitability, but not a better 
product. 
 137. Confidential interviews with insurers (interview notes on file with authors); see also Jett 
Hanna, Legal Malpractice Insurance and Limited Liability Entities: An Analysis of Malpractice Risk 
and Underwriting Responses, 39 S. TEX. L. REV. 641, 645 (1998) (stating that “[o]nly if the insurer pro-
vides coverage for prior affiliations of the attorney constituents of a limited liability entity will there 
conceivably be a reduced incident of loss as a result of limited liability status”); Robert W. Hillman, 
The Impact of Partnership Law on the Legal Profession, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 393, 409 (1998) (noting 
that “LLP status does not reduce the liability of the partnership itself, which means the need for insur-
ance underwriters to insist on implementation of monitoring mechanisms is largely unaffected by con-
version of a firm from a general partnership into an LLP”). 
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pany and had not altered liability insurance premiums.138  Accordingly, 
insurance companies apparently do not believe that unlimited liability 
causes law firms to render higher quality legal services.  Unless insurance 
companies have erred in their actuarial calculations or have failed to 
consider the possible connection between organizational form and liabil-
ity risk, this fact undermines the economic theories asserting that unlim-
ited liability results in a better legal product. 
V. CONCLUSION: EXPLAINING THE NEW YORK LAW FIRM MARKET 
In today’s litigious age, legal practitioners understandably are con-
cerned with the costs associated with liability, including liability for legal 
malpractice.  According to many sources, malpractice actions against law 
firms are increasingly common and judgments are becoming larger.139  In 
addition, malpractice insurance is more expensive, covers less, and by all 
accounts has not kept pace with the increased liability risks associated 
with larger transaction sizes and volatile markets.140  This is particularly 
true in high-risk legal fields, such as banking, securities, and other heavily 
regulated industries.141  As a result, it is not uncommon today to see law 
firm bankruptcies or law firm partners who incur personal liability as a 
result of malpractice judgments or other law firm debts.142 
An analysis of the empirical and interview data collected for this ar-
ticle, however, indicates that, at least with respect to New York law 
firms, the costs and benefits of limited liability are more complicated 
than either the academics or legal practitioners would like to believe.  
The rapid movement of firms into the LLP structure and the failure of 
 
 138. Confidential interviews with law firm partners (interview notes on file with authors). 
 139. ABA STANDING COMMITTEE ON LAWYERS’ PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY, THE PROFILE OF 
LEGAL MALPRACTICE CLAIMS: 1996–1999 (2001) (finding that insurers expect more frequent and se-
vere lawsuits against attorneys following economic downturns); ROLAND E. MALLEN & JEFFERY M. 
SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 1.6 (5th ed. 2000) (noting that the rise in malpractice suits is propor-
tionally larger than the increase in the number of practicing attorneys); Carol R. Goforth, Limiting the 
Liability of General Partners in LLPs: An Analysis of Statutory Alternatives, 75 OR. L. REV. 1139, 1142 
(1996); Johnson, supra note 6, at 85, 87; Manuel R. Ramos, Legal Malpractice: The Profession’s Dirty 
Little Secret, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1657, 1674–80 and App. B & D at 1741–42, 1749–50 (1994) (demon-
strating that malpractice claims have sharply increased). 
 140. INST. OF MGMT. & ADMIN., MANAGING RISK: WHAT LAW FIRMS MUST DO TO CONTROL 
LIABILITY INSURANCE COSTS (2003), available at 2003 WL 2068161 (stating that firms, especially lar-
ger firms, are likely to see substantial rises in liability insurance rates); Earl Ainsworth, Malpractice 
Insurance: A High Priced Headache for Lawyers, N.J. LAW., Mar. 10, 2003, at A2; Rita Henley Jensen, 
For Third Straight Year Malpractice Rates Rise Again, NAT’L. L.J., Apr. 12, 1993, at 2–3; Johnson, su-
pra note 6, at 88; Susan Saab Fortney, Legal Malpractice Insurance: Surviving the Perfect Storm, 28 J. 
LEGAL PROF. 41, 41–42 (2003–2004) (citing various factors that “have contributed to fewer insurers 
writing legal malpractice insurance, limited coverage offered by those insurers who remain in the mar-
ket, and dramatic premium increases for those policies that are available”); see also Confidential inter-
views with law firm partners (interview notes on file with authors); Confidential interviews with law 
firm insurers (interview notes on file with authors). 
 141. Johnson, supra note 6, at 88. 
 142. Coates, supra note 28, at 1352 tbl.3 (discussing law firm dissolutions); Johnson, supra note 6, 
at 88–89. 
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the empirical tests in Part III of this article to return the results predicted 
by existing partnership theories cast doubt on arguments that the unlim-
ited liability of the GP form provides the unqualified benefits asserted by 
many researchers.  At the same time, the fact that a substantial number 
of large and sophisticated law firms have opted to remain a GP despite 
the availability of a quick, inexpensive, and easy alternative undermines 
the arguments of legal practitioners who suggest that the GP form pro-
vides no benefits to those considering the formation of a business or pro-
fessional enterprise. 
A. The Future of GPs: A Penalty Partnership Theory 
Our empirical results indicate that most New York law firms have, 
in fact, abandoned the GP regime and our follow-up interviews with law 
firm partners whose firms are represented in our study indicate that the 
rest may at some point in time follow suit.  The asserted reasons for each 
firm’s choice of organizational form are telling and indicate that, for 
many partners, the perceived benefits of unlimited liability are real.  At 
the same time, however, the interviews indicate that this view is chang-
ing, and that most of those interviewed believe that full movement into 
the LLP form is inevitable.  If this is true, then the New York law firm 
market has not yet reached equilibrium. 
Consistent with these views, we predict that, with the advent of the 
LLP form, if the GP form is to continue to exist in the future, it will not 
be as an organizational form voluntarily chosen after carefully weighing 
the costs and benefits.  Instead, we predict that, as is the case with the 
New York law firms in our sample, parties in business and professional 
relationships will abandon the GP form altogether, and it will continue to 
exist primarily as a penalty default regime that forces the revelation of 
information to the state and interested third parties.  Accordingly, we 
add a new theory of partnership to those already advanced by lawyers 
and economists:  a penalty default theory of partnership. 
The penalty default theory of partnership arises from the fact that 
the GP is the ultimate default regime for businesses operated by more 
than one person.  If two or more parties run a business for profit and do 
nothing else, the GP default rules apply.143  The case law is full of situa-
tions where parties entered into a business and unintentionally ended up 
a partnership.144 
 
 143. See White Consol. Indus., Inc. v. Waterhouse, 158 F.R.D. 429, 434 n.7 (D. Minn. 1994) 
(“[W]hether a legally binding partnership has been formed is a question of fact which can be inferred 
from the partners’ actions. We are aware of no requirement that, in order to verify its formation, a 
partnership agreement must be filed with the State.”); Unif. P’ship Act § 6 (1914), 6 U.L.A. (pt. I) 
(2001) (defining “partnership”); Unif. P’ship Act §§ 101(4), 202 (1997), 6 U.L.A. (pt. I) (2001) (defin-
ing “partnership”). 
 144. See Reddington v. Thomas, 262 S.E.2d 841, 843 (N.C. Ct. App. 1980); Bass v. Bass, 814 
S.W.2d 38, 44 (Tenn. 1991); Howard Gault & Son v. First Nat’l Bank of Hereford, 541 S.W.2d 235, 237 
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We propose that the GP default rules may make sense—and may, in 
fact, be socially desirable—because they penalize parties who fail to for-
malize their arrangements, either by affirmatively choosing an organiza-
tional form that requires notification to the state, or through elaborate 
contractual drafting.  In the terms familiar to contract law scholars, the 
entire general partnership regime may operate as an information-forcing 
default rule. 
The state may desire such information-forcing from business and 
professional service firms for a variety of reasons.  First, by forcing par-
ties to file as LLPs, LLCs, or corporations, the state encourages the par-
ties to acknowledge they are a business association.  This recognition, 
then, pushes parties to explicitly resolve (or at least think about) many 
important issues—such as, for example, the division of profits—through 
careful negotiation and drafting.  And this, in turn, reduces the informa-
tion gathering burden on courts and creditors.145  Second, state notifica-
tion of the existence of a for-profit firm enables the state to take certain 
actions with respect to that firm.  For example, the state can more easily 
tax and regulate for-profit firms when it has been alerted to their exis-
tence.146 
B. Innovation and Diffusion: Status, Networks, and Signaling 
In addition, if the New York law firm market has not reached equi-
librium, this leads to two questions:  (1) why has full movement into the 
LLP form been so slow, and (2) why have some firms moved relatively 
quickly, while others have taken their time?  Our interview data reveal 
that law firms will go to great lengths (in this case, risking full personal 
liability) in order to avoid being perceived in a negative light relative to 
firms that they consider competitors for prestige and clients.  This finding 
is consistent with prior research on the importance of signaling and status 
when the quality of output is difficult for consumers to judge,147 and with 
research on herding behavior among law firms and other professionals.148  
This insight is also consistent with prior research on network effects and 
 
(Tex. Civ. App. 1976).  On the formation of partnerships, see generally ALAN R. BROMBERG & 
LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, BROMBERG AND RIBSTEIN ON PARTNERSHIP § 2.05 (2004). 
 145. For an article making a similar argument, see Larry E. Ribstein, Limited Liability Unlimited, 
24 DEL. J. CORP. L. 407, 448–49 (1999). 
 146. See Ribstein, supra note 44, at 223. 
 147. Candace Jones, Signaling Expertise: How Signals Shape Careers in Creative Industries, in 
CAREER CREATIVITY: EXPLORATIONS IN THE REMAKING OF WORK 209, 210 (Maury A. Peiperl et al. 
eds., 2002) (discussing the importance of signaling in the movie industry); Joel M. Podolny, A Status-
Based Model of Market Competition, 98(4) AM. J. SOC. 829, 830–35 (1993) (discussing the importance 
of status as a signal of quality); Price, supra note 76, at 25 (stating that law firms decided to match 
Gunderson’s salary increases because to fail to do so would signal that they were not a top tier firm). 
 148. See Ronald S. Burt, Social Contagion and Innovation: Cohesion Versus Structural Equiva-
lence, 92 AM. J. SOC. 1287, 1326 (1987) (demonstrating that whether or not an individual adopts an 
innovation is a function of whether or not equivalent peers have done so); Price, supra note 76, at 5 
(noting that professional organizations, especially law firms, tend to copy each other). 
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innovation, as (at least for the elite firms) it is only after a sufficient 
number of peer firms have become an LLP that the benefits of limited 
liability are judged to outweigh the perceived costs.149 
This finding also provides insight into two aspects of change and in-
novation that have interested lawyers and social scientists for some time, 
but which have received minimal empirical study:  (1) how new standards 
are adopted by particular market actors, and (2) how those changes then 
diffuse throughout the market.150  Our data indicate that elite firms 
adopted the new LLP form far more slowly than did their less elite New 
York counterparts.  Only after an exogenous shock—the Enron and Ar-
thur Andersen debacles, along with other corporate scandals—prompted 
some “higher bracket” firms to file as LLPs did the elite firms feel com-
fortable making this move.  In addition, our interview data reveal the 
mechanisms by which this diffusion occurred.  Not only did firms observe 
and copy the organizational form of their peer group, they explicitly co-
ordinated their actions so as to minimize any potential negative signal as-
sociated with differentiating themselves from their cohort in terms of or-
ganizational form.151 
In short, markets in equilibrium are frequently studied by social sci-
entists.  The adoption of the New York LLP statute, however, provides a 
rare opportunity to study a market in flux.  In 1994, the New York state 
legislature provided law firms with a viable alternative to the organiza-
tional form that most firms had been using for many years, in some cases, 
for centuries.  An analysis of how the market responded to this change 
provides valuable insights into the mechanisms by which change occurs 
and spreads across a market. 
 
 149. See Stephen Choi & Mitu Gulati, Innovation in Boilerplate Contracts: An Empirical Exami-
nation of Sovereign Bonds, 53 EMORY L.J. 929, 930–38 (2004) (recognizing that contracting parties 
often agree to suboptimal terms due to the equilibrium established by network externalities and dis-
cussing the methods by which standardized terms can change); Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, 
Standardization and Innovation in Corporate Contracting (Or “The Economics of Boilerplate”), 83 VA. 
L. REV. 713 (1997) (describing the “learning externalities” and “network externalities” that arise with 
the common use of a contract term); Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks 
of Contracts, 81 VA. L. REV. 757, 761 (1995) (suggesting that “when the use of a contract term be-
comes widespread, its value may rise”); Robert B. Ahdieh, Cueing Transition in Sovereign Debt Con-
tracts: Network Effects, Coordination Games, and Focal Points in the Choice of Mandate Versus Con-
tract, at 19–22 (Emory Pub. Law Research Paper No. 03-23, 2004) (describing the network benefits 
that can arise from corporate contracting).  But see Larry E. Ribstein & Bruce H. Kobayashi, Choice 
of Form and Network Externalities, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 79, 128 (2001) (finding that network ex-
ternalities—in the form of an established body of law—have only a minimal impact on the choice of 
organizational form); Michael J. Whincop, An Empirical Analysis of the Standardisation of Corporate 
Charter Terms: Opting Out of the Duty of Care, 23 INT’L. REV. L. & ECON. 285, 285–86 (2003) (finding 
similar evidence with respect to the evolution of Australian charter provisions). 
 150. See W. Scott Frame & Lawrence J. White, Empirical Studies of Financial Innovation: Lots of 
Talk, Little Action?, 42(1) J. ECON. LITERATURE 116, 121 (2004) (lamenting the lack of empirical re-
search on the impact of network effects on innovation). 
 151. Confidential interviews with law firm partners (interview notes on file with authors); see also 
Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner, Coordination Through Committees and Markets, 19 RAND J. ECON. 
235, 235 (1988) (studying the function of standardization committees in achieving coordination). 
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APPENDIX A 
FIRM FORM DATE LAWYERS OFFICES GROWTH 
Aaronson Rappaport 
Feinstein & Deutsch, 
LLP 
LLP 01/03/95 58 2 6.5 
Abelman Frayne & 
Schwab  
GP  29 1 4.9 
Afridi & Angell LLC LC 07/01/02 30 6  
Amster, Rothstein, & 
Ebenstein 
LLP 05/19/03 43 1 3.4 
Anderson Kill & Olick, 
PC 
PC 05/04/73 121 6  
Barnes, Richardson & 
Colburn 
GP  27 3 -0.1 
Barry, McTiernan & 
Moore 
GP  30 3 3.3 
Bernstein Litowitz Ber-
ger & Grossmann LLP 
LLP 09/28/95 34 4 13.8 
Bivona & Cohen, P.C. PC 01/10/79 37 5  
Borah, Goldstein, Alt-
schuler, Schwartz & 
Nahins, P.C. 
PC 11/14/79 45 1  
Brauner Baron 
Rosenzweig & Klein, 
L.L.P. 
LLP 12/23/94 28 1 -0.6 
Brown Raysman Mill-
stein Felder & Steiner 
LLP 
LLP 05/24/95 220 5 19.2 
Cadwalader Wicker-
sham & Taft LLP 
LLP 02/26/03 411 5 6.2 
Cahill Gordon & Rein-
del LLP 
LLP 04/29/03 225 3 1.9 
Carter Ledyard & Mil-
burn LLP 
LLP 11/14/02 118 3 4.5 
Chadbourne & Parke 
LLP 
LLP 08/08/95 428 7 4.2 
Cleary Gottlieb Steen & 
Hamilton 
GP  798 12 5.7 
Clifford Chance US LLP LLP 01/28/98 3500 32 19.9 
Cohen, Weiss and Simon 
LLP 
LLP 12/02/99 31 1 0.8 
Condon & Forsyth LLP LLP 05/07/98 51 3 3.8 
Conway, Farrell, Curtin 
& Kelly, P.C. 
PC 01/05/71 38 3  
Cooper & Dunham LLP LLP 12/28/94 38 1 3.2 
Coudert Brothers LLP LLP 09/05/01 630 25 7.9 
Cowan, Liebowitz & 
Latman, P.C. 
PC 12/01/72 50 1  
Cravath Swaine & 
Moore LLP 
LLP 03/25/03 499 3 5.6 
Curtis Mallet-Prevost 
Colt & Mosle LLP 
LLP 07/28/99 156 12 3.4 
D'Amato & Lynch GP  84 2 0.6 
Darby & Darby Profes-
sional Corporation 
PC 12/27/73 73 2  
Davidoff, Malito and 
Hutcher, LLP 
LLP 12/22/94 42 4 5.6 
Davidson, Davidson & 
Kappel, LLC 
LLC 04/01/98 26 1  
Davis & Gilbert, LLP LLP 03/10/98 84 1 9.0 
Davis Polk & Wardwell GP  624 9 5.6 
Debevoise & Plimpton 
LLP 
LLP 12/30/03 514 8 6.3 
Dewey Ballantine LLP LLP 09/26/97 550 13 5.5 
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Dreier LLP LLP 10/17/97 28 1 75.5 
Eaton & Van Winkle 
LLP 
LLP 09/04/02 27 2 6.1 
Emmet Marvin & Mar-
tin LLP 
LLP 12/30/94 62 3 1.5 
Epstein Becker & Green 
PC 
PC 06/23/80 355 12  
Esanu Katsky Korins & 
Siger, LLP 
LLP 07/18/97 33 1 4.5 
Fischbein Badillo Wag-
ner Harding 
GP  79 3 3.9 
Fish & Neave GP  173 3 4.4 
Fitzpatrick Cella Harper 
& Scinto 
GP  142 3 7.1 
Flemming, Zulack & 
Williamson, LLP 
LLP 11/23/94 28 2 2.4 
Ford Marrin Esposito 
Witmeyer & Gleser, 
L.L.P. 
LLP 03/02/95 27 2 2.2 
Fragomen, Del Rey, 
Bernsen & Loewy, LLP  
LLP 06/29/04 141 17 19.7 
Frankfurt Kurnit Klein 
& Selz, PC 
PC 09/24/80 41 1  
Fried Frank Harris 
Shriver & Jacobson LLP 
LLP 12/23/03 550 5 4.0 
Friedman Kaplan Seiler 
& Adelman LLP 
LLP 04/13/95 47 2 11.1 
Frommer Lawrence & 
Haug LLP 
LLP 09/02/97 52 2 19.3 
Fross Zelnick Lehrman 
& Zissu, P.C. 
PC 04/02/82 49 1  
Gianni Origoni Grippo 
& Partners 
GP  270 7 9.4 
Gibney, Anthony & 
Flaherty, LLP 
LLP 11/30/94 34 4 -1.5 
Goldberg Weprin & 
Ustin LLP 
LLP 11/21/96 27 1 7.3 
Goldfarb & Fleece GP  26 1 4.9 
Golenbock Eiseman 
Assor Bell & Peskoe 
LLP 
LLP 08/29/03 35 1 9.5 
Goodkind Labaton 
Rudoff & Sucharow 
LLP 
LLP 10/26/94 46 2 3.5 
Gordon & Silber, P.C. PC 07/03/79 29 2  
Graubard Miller GP  28 1 -3.4 
Grubman Indursky 
Schindler & Goldstein, 
P.C. 
PC 10/01/74 30 1  
Grunfeld, Desiderio, 
Lebowitz, Silverman & 
Klestadt LLP 
LLP 03/16/95 32 4 4.1 
Hahn & Hessen LLP LLP 05/23/95 48 2 -0.6 
Hawkins Delafield & 
Wood LLP 
LLP 12/18/03 111 7 1.1 
Healy & Baillie, LLP LLP 08/22/96 27 3 4.3 
Heidell Pittoni Murphy 
& Bach LLP 
LLP 12/15/98 64 2 4.1 
Herrick Feinstein LLP LLP 12/27/94 124 3 13.7 
Herzfeld & Rubin PC PC 09/29/71 100 6  
Hughes Hubbard & 
Reed LLP 
LLP 05/14/96 303 7 2.9 
Jacobowitz, Garfinkel & 
Lesman 
GP  32 1 9.3 
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Jones Hirsch Connors & 
Bull P.C. 
PC 01/29/97 50 5  
Kane Kessler, P.C. PC 02/01/71 32 2  
Kasowitz Benson Torres 
& Friedman LLP 
LLP 03/14/95 150 5 17.0 
Kaufman Borgeest & 
Ryan LLP 
LLP 03/14/03 67 5 29.2 
Kaye Scholer LLP LLP 12/29/95 400 9 4.1 
Kelley Drye & Warren 
LLP 
LLP 05/09/96 305 8 0.2 
Kenyon & Kenyon GP  198 3 11.4 
Kleinberg, Kaplan, 
Wolff & Cohen, P.C. 
PC 10/27/75 26 2  
Kopff, Nardelli & Dopf 
LLP 
LLP 07/24/96 28 1 -3.1 
Kramer Levin Naftalis 
& Frankel LLP 
LLP 10/23/98 260 2 9.0 
Kronish Lieb Weiner & 
Hellman LLP 
LLP 03/01/95 101 1 4.8 
Kurzman Eisenberg 
Corbin Lever & Good-
man, LLP 
LLP 02/14/95 27 2 13.6 
Ladas & Parry LLP 11/21/03 50 5 1.3 
Landman Corsi Ballaine 
& Ford P.C. 
PC 09/18/95 46 3  
LeBoeuf Lamb Greene 
& Macrae LLP 
LLP 10/24/94 650 22 1.7 
Lester Schwab Katz & 
Dwyer LLP 
LLP 06/16/99 65 2 -3.7 
London Fischer LLP LLP 05/11/99 50 2 30.1 
Martin Clearwater & 
Bell LLP 
LLP 10/17/02 70 3 4.3 
McAloon & Friedman, 
P.C. 
PC 10/07/77 37 1  
McLaughlin & Stern, 
LLP 
LLP 11/15/94 47 2 10.0 
Mendes & Mount LLP LLP 12/11/95 160 3 0.1 
Milbank Tweed Hadley 
& McCloy LLP 
LLP 02/01/99 496 9 4.4 
Morgan & Finnegan 
LLP 
LLP 12/19/94 98 2 1.6 
Morris Duffy Alonso & 
Faley 
LLP 09/06/95 80 1  
Morrison Cohen Singer 
& Weinstein LLP 
LLP 12/23/94 83 1 7.7 
Morvillo, Abramowitz, 
Grand, Iason & Silber-
berg, P.C. 
PC 09/06/79 38 1  
Moses & Singer LLP LLP 05/24/95 65 2 3.8 
Mound Cotton Wollan 
& Greengrass 
GP  73 5 3.2 
Newman Fitch Altheim 
Myers, P.C. 
PC 06/25/75 41 2  
Nicoletti Hornig Camp-
ise Sweeney & Paige 
GP  28 2 28.9 
Ohrenstein & Brown 
LLP 
LLP 04/27/95 56 3 8.7 
Olshan Grundman 
Frome Rosenzweig & 
Wolosky LLP 
LLP 07/10/95 54 2 6.8 
Ostrolenk, Faber, Gerb 
& Soffen, LLP 
LLP 06/08/95 28 2 1.4 
Otterbourg Steindler 
Houston & Rosen PC 
PC 06/09/70 58 1  
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Patterson, Belknap, 
Webb & Tyler LLP  
LLP 12/30/94 181 1 4.2 
Paul Weiss Rifkind 
Wharton & Garrison 
LLP 
LLP 12/23/02 500 7 4.4 
Pavia & Harcourt LLP LLP 07/30/01 34 1 -4.4 
Phillips Nizer LLP LLP 05/11/95 78 3 -2.7 
Proskauer Rose LLP LLP 01/26/95 600 7 4.1 
Pryor Cashman 
Sherman & Flynn LLP 
LLP 03/27/98 125 1 4.3 
Putney, Twombly, Hall 
& Hirson LLP 
LLP 12/04/98 29 4 2.8 
Quirk and Bakalor, P.C. PC 09/14/71 29 2  
Richards Spears Kibbe 
& Orbe LLP 
LLP 12/31/02 55 2 14.4 
Roberts & Holland LLP LLP 11/09/94 40 2 -0.4 
Robinson Brog Lein-
wand Greene Genovese 
& Gluck P.C. 
PC 02/14/72 50 1  
Rosenberg & Estis, P.C. PC 06/02/76 36 1  
Sabin, Bermant & 
Gould LLP 
LLP 12/20/95 36 1 5.4 
Salans GP  400 14 21.2 
Satterlee Stephens 
Burke & Burke LLP 
LLP 12/30/94 58 2 -0.5 
Schulte Roth & Zabel 
LLP 
LLP 08/23/96 300 2 7.2 
Seward & Kissel LLP LLP 01/26/99 115 2 3.6 
Shearman & Sterling 
LLP 
LLP 06/16/03 697 18 7.7 
Simpson Thacher & 
Bartlett LLP 
LLP 05/23/03 602 6 6.7 
Skadden Arps Slate 
Meagher & Flom LLP 
LLP 05/25/01 1750 21 5.9 
Smith Mazure Director 
Wilkins Young Yager-
man & Tarallo, P.C. 
PC 12/09/88 32 1  
Snow Becker Krauss 
P.C. 
PC 02/21/80 26 1  
Sokolow, Dunaud, Mer-
cadier & Carreras LLP 
LLP 02/03/98 38 4 44.3 
Stroock & Stroock & 
Lavan LLP 
LLP 01/24/97 345 3 0.2 
Sullivan & Cromwell 
LLP 
LLP 12/20/02 661 12 10.6 
Sullivan Papain Block 
McGrath & Cannavo 
P.C. 
PC 09/23/74 35 3  
Tannenbaum Helpern 
Syracuse & Hirschtritt 
LLP 
LLP 06/13/95 46 2 9.1 
Thacher Proffitt & 
Wood LLP 
LLP 09/02/03 191 5 6.7 
Thelen Reid & Priest 
LLP 
LLP 11/19/96 408 6 4.3 
Torys, LLP LLP 11/30/01 280 2 4.0 
Wachtel & Masyr, LLP LLP 12/13/94 34 1 1.0 
Wachtell Lipton Rosen 
& Katz   
GP  181 1 7.0 
Warshaw Burstein 
Cohen Schlesinger & 
Kuh, LLP 
LLP 03/02/95 34 1 -0.3 
Watson Farley & Wil-
liams  
GP  220 7 -1.8 
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Weil Gotshal & Manges 
LLP 
LLP 12/18/95 1000 17 5.5 
Weitz & Luxenberg, PC PC 02/01/91 45 4  
White & Case LLP LLP 12/29/97 1700 37 8.1 
White, Fleischner & 
Fino 
LLP 11/09/00 30 3 2.7 
Willkie Farr & Galla-
gher LLP 
LLP 08/29/03 507 8 4.5 
Wilson, Elser, Mosko-
witz, Edelman & Dicker 
LLP 
LLP 02/26/98 225 19 3.8 
Windels Marx Lane & 
Mittendorf LLP 
LLP 12/22/99 100 5 9.1 
Wolf Haldenstein Adler 
Freeman & Herz LLP 
LLP 11/16/94 55 5 3.7 
Wollmuth Maher & 
Deutsch LLP 
LLP 03/31/98 26 2 40.1 
Wormser, Kiely, Galef 
& Jacobs LLP 
LLP 02/05/97 36 2 -0.1 
Zeichner Ellman & 
Krause LLP 
LLP 04/26/99 27 3 -0.6 
APPENDIX B 
FIRM SALARY TIER COLLEGIAL 
Amster, Rothstein, & Ebenstein 120,000 no N 
Anderson Kill & Olick, PC 115,000 yes C 
Brown Raysman Millstein Felder & Steiner LLP 125,000 yes N 
Cadwalader Wickersham & Taft LLP 125,000 no C 
Cahill Gordon & Reindel LLP 125,000 no N 
Carter Ledyard & Milburn LLP 120,000 no C 
Chadbourne & Parke LLP 125,000 no N 
Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton 125,000 no C 
Clifford Chance US LLP 125,000 yes C 
Cooper & Dunham LLP 115,000 yes N 
Coudert Brothers LLP 125,000 yes N 
Cravath Swaine & Moore LLP 125,000 no N 
Curtis Mallet-Prevost Colt & Mosle LLP 125,000 yes N 
Darby & Darby Professional Corporation 125,000 no N 
Davis Polk & Wardwell 125,000 no C 
Debevoise & Plimpton LLP 125,000 no C 
Dewey Ballantine LLP 125,000 no C 
Epstein Becker & Green PC   N 
Fish & Neave 125,000 no N 
Fitzpatrick Cella Harper & Scinto 125,000 no N 
Fragomen, Del Rey, Bernsen & Loewy, LLP  95,000 yes C 
Fried Frank Harris Shriver & Jacobson LLP 125,000 no C 
Friedman Kaplan Seiler & Adelman LLP 125,000 no C 
Frommer Lawrence & Haug LLP 130,000 no N 
Hahn & Hessen LLP 110,000 no C 
Hawkins Delafield & Wood LLP 100,000 yes C 
Herrick Feinstein LLP 130,000 yes N 
Hughes Hubbard & Reed LLP 125,000 no N 
Kasowitz Benson Torres & Friedman LLP  no C 
Kaye Scholer LLP 125,000 no N 
Kelley Drye & Warren LLP 125,000 no C 
Kenyon & Kenyon 125,000 yes N 
Kramer Levin Naftalis & Frankel LLP 125,000 no C 
Kronish Lieb Weiner & Hellman LLP 125,000 no C 
LeBoeuf Lamb Greene & Macrae LLP 125,000 no N 
Milbank Tweed Hadley & McCloy LLP 125,000  N 
Morgan & Finnegan LLP 125,000 no N 
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Morrison Cohen Singer & Weinstein LLP   N 
Moses & Singer LLP 92,000 no  
Olshan Grundman Frome Rosenzweig & Wolosky 
LLP 
115,000 no C 
Otterbourg Steindler Houston & Rosen PC 115,000 no N 
Patterson, Belknap, Webb & Tyler LLP  125,000 no C 
Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Garrison LLP 125,000 no N 
Proskauer Rose LLP 125,000 no N 
Pryor Cashman Sherman & Flynn LLP 110,000 no N 
Salans 112,500 yes N 
Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP 125,000 no N 
Seward & Kissel LLP 140,000 no N 
Shearman & Sterling LLP 125,000 no N 
Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP 125,000 no C 
Skadden Arps Slate Meagher & Flom LLP 140,000 no N 
Stroock & Stroock & Lavan LLP 125,000 no N 
Sullivan & Cromwell LLP 125,000 no N 
Thacher Proffitt & Wood LLP 125,000 no C 
Thelen Reid & Priest LLP 125,000 yes C 
Torys, LLP 125,000 no C 
Wachtell Lipton Rosen & Katz   140,000 no C 
Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP 125,000 no C 
White & Case LLP 125,000 yes N 
Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP 125,000 no C 
Windels Marx Lane & Mittendorf LLP   N 
APPENDIX C 
FIRM FORTUNE IN-HOUSE TOTAL 
IN-HOUSE 
AVERAGE 
Amster, Rothstein, & Ebenstein 1 34 34 
Anderson Kill & Olick, PC 1 120 120 
Brown Raysman Millstein Felder & Steiner 
LLP 1 50 50 
Cadwalader Wickersham & Taft LLP 5 745 149 
Cahill Gordon & Reindel LLP 2 396 198 
Chadbourne & Parke LLP 1 76 76 
Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton 6 1512 252 
Clifford Chance US LLP 9 1884 209.3333333 
Cowan, Liebowitz & Latman, P.C. 3 457 152.3333333 
Cravath Swaine & Moore LLP 9 1886 209.5555556 
Davis & Gilbert, LLP 1 27 27 
Davis Polk & Wardwell 16 1677 104.8125 
Debevoise & Plimpton LLP 7 843 120.4285714 
Dewey Ballantine LLP 2 208 104 
Epstein Becker & Green PC 5 713 142.6 
Fish & Neave 6 1383 230.5 
Fitzpatrick Cella Harper & Scinto 3 337 112.3333333 
Fragomen, Del Rey, Bernsen & Loewy, 
LLP 1 154 154 
Fried Frank Harris Shriver & Jacobson LLP 6 761 126.8333333 
Friedman Kaplan Seiler & Adelman LLP 1 73 73 
Hughes Hubbard & Reed LLP 3 357 119 
Kasowitz Benson Torres & Friedman LLP 1 11 11 
Kaye Scholer LLP 3 417 139 
Kelley Drye & Warren LLP 1 89 89 
Kenyon & Kenyon 1 246 246 
Kramer Levin Naftalis & Frankel LLP 2 1050 525 
Ladas & Parry 6 1598 266.3333333 
LeBoeuf Lamb Greene & Macrae LLP 7 1616 230.8571429 
Milbank Tweed Hadley & McCloy LLP 2 1050 525 
Morgan & Finnegan LLP 1 174 174 
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Morrison Cohen Singer & Weinstein LLP 1 17 17 
Patterson, Belknap, Webb & Tyler LLP 2 320 160 
Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Garrison LLP 7 2143 306.1428571 
Proskauer Rose LLP 7 2084 297.7142857 
Shearman & Sterling LLP 6 2632 438.6666667 
Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP 14 2047 146.2142857 
Skadden Arps Slate Meagher & Flom LLP 32 4337 135.53125 
Stroock & Stroock & Lavan LLP 4 331 82.75 
Sullivan & Cromwell LLP 7 1606 229.4285714 
Thelen Reid & Priest LLP 6 172 28.66666667 
Wachtell Lipton Rosen & Katz 13 1562 120.1538462 
Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP 7 2380 340 
White & Case LLP 3 335 111.6666667 
APPENDIX D 
FIRM YEAR PROFITS 
Brown Raysman Millstein Felder & Steiner LLP 1993  
Brown Raysman Millstein Felder & Steiner LLP 1994  
Brown Raysman Millstein Felder & Steiner LLP 1995  
Brown Raysman Millstein Felder & Steiner LLP 1996  
Brown Raysman Millstein Felder & Steiner LLP 1997  
Brown Raysman Millstein Felder & Steiner LLP 1998  
Brown Raysman Millstein Felder & Steiner LLP 1999  
Brown Raysman Millstein Felder & Steiner LLP 2000  
Brown Raysman Millstein Felder & Steiner LLP 2001  
Brown Raysman Millstein Felder & Steiner LLP 2002 530000 
Brown Raysman Millstein Felder & Steiner LLP 2003 565000 
Cadwalader Wickersham & Taft LLP 1993 505000 
Cadwalader Wickersham & Taft LLP 1994 425000 
Cadwalader Wickersham & Taft LLP 1995 565000 
Cadwalader Wickersham & Taft LLP 1996 645000 
Cadwalader Wickersham & Taft LLP 1997 785000 
Cadwalader Wickersham & Taft LLP 1998 820000 
Cadwalader Wickersham & Taft LLP 1999 935000 
Cadwalader Wickersham & Taft LLP 2000 1040000 
Cadwalader Wickersham & Taft LLP 2001 1105000 
Cadwalader Wickersham & Taft LLP 2002 1250000 
Cadwalader Wickersham & Taft LLP 2003 1610000 
Cahill Gordon & Reindel LLP 1993 1210000 
Cahill Gordon & Reindel LLP 1994 1200000 
Cahill Gordon & Reindel LLP 1995 1250000 
Cahill Gordon & Reindel LLP 1996 1400000 
Cahill Gordon & Reindel LLP 1997 1445000 
Cahill Gordon & Reindel LLP 1998 1600000 
Cahill Gordon & Reindel LLP 1999 1710000 
Cahill Gordon & Reindel LLP 2000 1610000 
Cahill Gordon & Reindel LLP 2001 1805000 
Cahill Gordon & Reindel LLP 2002 1845000 
Cahill Gordon & Reindel LLP 2003 2405000 
Chadbourne & Parke LLP 1993 525000 
Chadbourne & Parke LLP 1994 515000 
Chadbourne & Parke LLP 1995 545000 
Chadbourne & Parke LLP 1996 610000 
Chadbourne & Parke LLP 1997 535000 
Chadbourne & Parke LLP 1998 615000 
Chadbourne & Parke LLP 1999 815000 
Chadbourne & Parke LLP 2000 940000 
Chadbourne & Parke LLP 2001 980000 
Chadbourne & Parke LLP 2002 1000000 
Chadbourne & Parke LLP 2003 1010000 
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Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton 1993 890000 
Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton 1994 885000 
Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton 1995 910000 
Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton 1996 975000 
Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton 1997 1060000 
Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton 1998 1075000 
Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton 1999 1225000 
Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton 2000 1250000 
Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton 2001 1325000 
Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton 2002 1445000 
Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton 2003 1445000 
Coudert Brothers LLP 1993 260000 
Coudert Brothers LLP 1994 370000 
Coudert Brothers LLP 1995 310000 
Coudert Brothers LLP 1996 315000 
Coudert Brothers LLP 1997 380000 
Coudert Brothers LLP 1998 395000 
Coudert Brothers LLP 1999 425000 
Coudert Brothers LLP 2000 390000 
Coudert Brothers LLP 2001 455000 
Coudert Brothers LLP 2002 475000 
Coudert Brothers LLP 2003 420000 
Cravath Swaine & Moore LLP 1993 1410000 
Cravath Swaine & Moore LLP 1994 1225000 
Cravath Swaine & Moore LLP 1995 1340000 
Cravath Swaine & Moore LLP 1996 1515000 
Cravath Swaine & Moore LLP 1997 1790000 
Cravath Swaine & Moore LLP 1998 2050000 
Cravath Swaine & Moore LLP 1999 2110000 
Cravath Swaine & Moore LLP 2000 2245000 
Cravath Swaine & Moore LLP 2001 2135000 
Cravath Swaine & Moore LLP 2002 1960000 
Cravath Swaine & Moore LLP 2003 2080000 
Curtis Mallet-Prevost Colt & Mosle LLP 1993  
Curtis Mallet-Prevost Colt & Mosle LLP 1994  
Curtis Mallet-Prevost Colt & Mosle LLP 1995  
Curtis Mallet-Prevost Colt & Mosle LLP 1996  
Curtis Mallet-Prevost Colt & Mosle LLP 1997  
Curtis Mallet-Prevost Colt & Mosle LLP 1998 615000 
Curtis Mallet-Prevost Colt & Mosle LLP 1999 655000 
Curtis Mallet-Prevost Colt & Mosle LLP 2000 700000 
Curtis Mallet-Prevost Colt & Mosle LLP 2001  
Curtis Mallet-Prevost Colt & Mosle LLP 2002  
Curtis Mallet-Prevost Colt & Mosle LLP 2003  
Davis Polk & Wardwell 1993 1020000 
Davis Polk & Wardwell 1994 940000 
Davis Polk & Wardwell 1995 975000 
Davis Polk & Wardwell 1996 1125000 
Davis Polk & Wardwell 1997 1295000 
Davis Polk & Wardwell 1998 1530000 
Davis Polk & Wardwell 1999 1610000 
Davis Polk & Wardwell 2000 1740000 
Davis Polk & Wardwell 2001 1775000 
Davis Polk & Wardwell 2002 1775000 
Davis Polk & Wardwell 2003 1925000 
Debevoise & Plimpton LLP 1993 685000 
Debevoise & Plimpton LLP 1994 805000 
Debevoise & Plimpton LLP 1995 890000 
Debevoise & Plimpton LLP 1996 1020000 
Debevoise & Plimpton LLP 1997 1105000 
Debevoise & Plimpton LLP 1998 1200000 
Debevoise & Plimpton LLP 1999 1225000 
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Debevoise & Plimpton LLP 2000 1225000 
Debevoise & Plimpton LLP 2001 1105000 
Debevoise & Plimpton LLP 2002 1085000 
Debevoise & Plimpton LLP 2003 1260000 
Dewey Ballantine LLP 1993 510000 
Dewey Ballantine LLP 1994 515000 
Dewey Ballantine LLP 1995 530000 
Dewey Ballantine LLP 1996 650000 
Dewey Ballantine LLP 1997 780000 
Dewey Ballantine LLP 1998 860000 
Dewey Ballantine LLP 1999 950000 
Dewey Ballantine LLP 2000 1035000 
Dewey Ballantine LLP 2001 1075000 
Dewey Ballantine LLP 2002 1125000 
Dewey Ballantine LLP 2003 1150000 
Fish & Neave 1993  
Fish & Neave 1994  
Fish & Neave 1995  
Fish & Neave 1996  
Fish & Neave 1997  
Fish & Neave 1998 740000 
Fish & Neave 1999 700000 
Fish & Neave 2000 675000 
Fish & Neave 2001 725000 
Fish & Neave 2002 800000 
Fish & Neave 2003 730000 
Fried Frank Harris Shriver & Jacobson LLP 1993 400000 
Fried Frank Harris Shriver & Jacobson LLP 1994 400000 
Fried Frank Harris Shriver & Jacobson LLP 1995 495000 
Fried Frank Harris Shriver & Jacobson LLP 1996 615000 
Fried Frank Harris Shriver & Jacobson LLP 1997 580000 
Fried Frank Harris Shriver & Jacobson LLP 1998 760000 
Fried Frank Harris Shriver & Jacobson LLP 1999 855000 
Fried Frank Harris Shriver & Jacobson LLP 2000 1045000 
Fried Frank Harris Shriver & Jacobson LLP 2001 875000 
Fried Frank Harris Shriver & Jacobson LLP 2002 930000 
Fried Frank Harris Shriver & Jacobson LLP 2003 980000 
Hughes Hubbard & Reed LLP 1993 300000 
Hughes Hubbard & Reed LLP 1994 325000 
Hughes Hubbard & Reed LLP 1995 335000 
Hughes Hubbard & Reed LLP 1996 350000 
Hughes Hubbard & Reed LLP 1997 400000 
Hughes Hubbard & Reed LLP 1998 420000 
Hughes Hubbard & Reed LLP 1999 450000 
Hughes Hubbard & Reed LLP 2000 520000 
Hughes Hubbard & Reed LLP 2001 640,000 
Hughes Hubbard & Reed LLP 2002 820000 
Hughes Hubbard & Reed LLP 2003 950000 
Kaye Scholer LLP 1993 535000 
Kaye Scholer LLP 1994 490000 
Kaye Scholer LLP 1995 475000 
Kaye Scholer LLP 1996 445000 
Kaye Scholer LLP 1997 525000 
Kaye Scholer LLP 1998 620000 
Kaye Scholer LLP 1999 690000 
Kaye Scholer LLP 2000 795000 
Kaye Scholer LLP 2001 890000 
Kaye Scholer LLP 2002 980000 
Kaye Scholer LLP 2003 1070000 
Kelley Drye & Warren LLP 1993 255000 
Kelley Drye & Warren LLP 1994 200000 
Kelley Drye & Warren LLP 1995 275000 
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Kelley Drye & Warren LLP 1996 400000 
Kelley Drye & Warren LLP 1997 430000 
Kelley Drye & Warren LLP 1998 515000 
Kelley Drye & Warren LLP 1999 575000 
Kelley Drye & Warren LLP 2000 840000 
Kelley Drye & Warren LLP 2001 625000 
Kelley Drye & Warren LLP 2002 810000 
Kelley Drye & Warren LLP 2003 790000 
Kenyon & Kenyon 1993  
Kenyon & Kenyon 1994  
Kenyon & Kenyon 1995  
Kenyon & Kenyon 1996  
Kenyon & Kenyon 1997  
Kenyon & Kenyon 1998 550000 
Kenyon & Kenyon 1999 500000 
Kenyon & Kenyon 2000 565000 
Kenyon & Kenyon 2001 615,000 
Kenyon & Kenyon 2002 770000 
Kenyon & Kenyon 2003 685000 
Kramer Levin Naftalis & Frankel LLP 1993  
Kramer Levin Naftalis & Frankel LLP 1994  
Kramer Levin Naftalis & Frankel LLP 1995  
Kramer Levin Naftalis & Frankel LLP 1996  
Kramer Levin Naftalis & Frankel LLP 1997  
Kramer Levin Naftalis & Frankel LLP 1998 685000 
Kramer Levin Naftalis & Frankel LLP 1999 710000 
Kramer Levin Naftalis & Frankel LLP 2000 750000 
Kramer Levin Naftalis & Frankel LLP 2001 795000 
Kramer Levin Naftalis & Frankel LLP 2002 935000 
Kramer Levin Naftalis & Frankel LLP 2003 1040000 
LeBoeuf Lamb Greene & Mac Rae LLP 1993 340000 
LeBoeuf Lamb Greene & Mac Rae LLP 1994 365000 
LeBoeuf Lamb Greene & Mac Rae LLP 1995 360000 
LeBoeuf Lamb Greene & Mac Rae LLP 1996 400000 
LeBoeuf Lamb Greene & Mac Rae LLP 1997 450000 
LeBoeuf Lamb Greene & Mac Rae LLP 1998 550000 
LeBoeuf Lamb Greene & Mac Rae LLP 1999 620000 
LeBoeuf Lamb Greene & Mac Rae LLP 2000 645000 
LeBoeuf Lamb Greene & Mac Rae LLP 2001 705000 
LeBoeuf Lamb Greene & Mac Rae LLP 2002 855000 
LeBoeuf Lamb Greene & Mac Rae LLP 2003 935000 
Milbank Tweed Hadley & McCloy LLP 1993 540000 
Milbank Tweed Hadley & McCloy LLP 1994 575000 
Milbank Tweed Hadley & McCloy LLP 1995 590000 
Milbank Tweed Hadley & McCloy LLP 1996 735000 
Milbank Tweed Hadley & McCloy LLP 1997 860000 
Milbank Tweed Hadley & McCloy LLP 1998 1105000 
Milbank Tweed Hadley & McCloy LLP 1999 1275000 
Milbank Tweed Hadley & McCloy LLP 2000 1450000 
Milbank Tweed Hadley & McCloy LLP 2001 1600000 
Milbank Tweed Hadley & McCloy LLP 2002 1785000 
Milbank Tweed Hadley & McCloy LLP 2003 1820000 
Patterson, Belknap, Webb & Tyler LLP  1993  
Patterson, Belknap, Webb & Tyler LLP  1994  
Patterson, Belknap, Webb & Tyler LLP  1995  
Patterson, Belknap, Webb & Tyler LLP  1996  
Patterson, Belknap, Webb & Tyler LLP  1997  
Patterson, Belknap, Webb & Tyler LLP  1998 470000 
Patterson, Belknap, Webb & Tyler LLP  1999 550000 
Patterson, Belknap, Webb & Tyler LLP  2000 620000 
Patterson, Belknap, Webb & Tyler LLP  2001 600000 
Patterson, Belknap, Webb & Tyler LLP  2002 730000 
(Continued on next page) 
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Patterson, Belknap, Webb & Tyler LLP  2003 900000 
Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Garrison LLP 1993 610000 
Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Garrison LLP 1994 655000 
Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Garrison LLP 1995 675000 
Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Garrison LLP 1996 745000 
Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Garrison LLP 1997 865000 
Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Garrison LLP 1998 825000 
Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Garrison LLP 1999 1050000 
Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Garrison LLP 2000 1210000 
Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Garrison LLP 2001 1680000 
Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Garrison LLP 2002 1740000 
Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Garrison LLP 2003 1840000 
Proskauer Rose LLP 1993 400000 
Proskauer Rose LLP 1994 420000 
Proskauer Rose LLP 1995 480000 
Proskauer Rose LLP 1996 510000 
Proskauer Rose LLP 1997 600000 
Proskauer Rose LLP 1998 660000 
Proskauer Rose LLP 1999 740000 
Proskauer Rose LLP 2000 915000 
Proskauer Rose LLP 2001 965000 
Proskauer Rose LLP 2002 1025000 
Proskauer Rose LLP 2003 1080000 
Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP 1993  
Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP 1994  
Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP 1995  
Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP 1996 610000 
Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP 1997 670000 
Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP 1998 725000 
Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP 1999 825000 
Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP 2000 875000 
Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP 2001 950000 
Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP 2002 1090000 
Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP 2003 1540000 
Shearman & Sterling LLP 1993 590000 
Shearman & Sterling LLP 1994 625000 
Shearman & Sterling LLP 1995 595000 
Shearman & Sterling LLP 1996 815000 
Shearman & Sterling LLP 1997 920000 
Shearman & Sterling LLP 1998 1045000 
Shearman & Sterling LLP 1999 1135000 
Shearman & Sterling LLP 2000 1350000 
Shearman & Sterling LLP 2001 950000 
Shearman & Sterling LLP 2002 1275000 
Shearman & Sterling LLP 2003 1215000 
Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP 1993 925000 
Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP 1994 930000 
Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP 1995 1110000 
Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP 1996 1155000 
Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP 1997 1285000 
Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP 1998 1495000 
Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP 1999 1655000 
Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP 2000 1740000 
Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP 2001 1690000 
Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP 2002 1845000 
Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP 2003 1940000 
Skadden Arps Slate Meagher & Flom LLP 1993 690000 
Skadden Arps Slate Meagher & Flom LLP 1994 820000 
Skadden Arps Slate Meagher & Flom LLP 1995 885000 
Skadden Arps Slate Meagher & Flom LLP 1996 990000 
Skadden Arps Slate Meagher & Flom LLP 1997 1290000 
Skadden Arps Slate Meagher & Flom LLP 1998 1380000 
(Continued on next page) 
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Skadden Arps Slate Meagher & Flom LLP 1999 1600000 
Skadden Arps Slate Meagher & Flom LLP 2000 1600000 
Skadden Arps Slate Meagher & Flom LLP 2001 1565000 
Skadden Arps Slate Meagher & Flom LLP 2002 1605000 
Skadden Arps Slate Meagher & Flom LLP 2003 1600000 
Stroock & Stroock & Lavan LLP 1993 490000 
Stroock & Stroock & Lavan LLP 1994 495000 
Stroock & Stroock & Lavan LLP 1995 485000 
Stroock & Stroock & Lavan LLP 1996 500000 
Stroock & Stroock & Lavan LLP 1997 560000 
Stroock & Stroock & Lavan LLP 1998 595000 
Stroock & Stroock & Lavan LLP 1999 630000 
Stroock & Stroock & Lavan LLP 2000 685000 
Stroock & Stroock & Lavan LLP 2001 785000 
Stroock & Stroock & Lavan LLP 2002 800000 
Stroock & Stroock & Lavan LLP 2003 920000 
Sullivan & Cromwell LLP 1993 1275000 
Sullivan & Cromwell LLP 1994 1185000 
Sullivan & Cromwell LLP 1995 1310000 
Sullivan & Cromwell LLP 1996 1330000 
Sullivan & Cromwell LLP 1997 1450000 
Sullivan & Cromwell LLP 1998 1645000 
Sullivan & Cromwell LLP 1999 1790000 
Sullivan & Cromwell LLP 2000 1715000 
Sullivan & Cromwell LLP 2001 1670000 
Sullivan & Cromwell LLP 2002 1720000 
Sullivan & Cromwell LLP 2003 1900000 
Thacher Proffitt & Wood LLP 1993  
Thacher Proffitt & Wood LLP 1994  
Thacher Proffitt & Wood LLP 1995  
Thacher Proffitt & Wood LLP 1996  
Thacher Proffitt & Wood LLP 1997  
Thacher Proffitt & Wood LLP 1998 415000 
Thacher Proffitt & Wood LLP 1999 480000 
Thacher Proffitt & Wood LLP 2000 480000 
Thacher Proffitt & Wood LLP 2001 475000 
Thacher Proffitt & Wood LLP 2002 640000 
Thacher Proffitt & Wood LLP 2003 810000 
Thelen Reid & Priest LLP 1993  
Thelen Reid & Priest LLP 1994  
Thelen Reid & Priest LLP 1995  
Thelen Reid & Priest LLP 1996  
Thelen Reid & Priest LLP 1997  
Thelen Reid & Priest LLP 1998 405000 
Thelen Reid & Priest LLP 1999 465000 
Thelen Reid & Priest LLP 2000 500000 
Thelen Reid & Priest LLP 2001 560000 
Thelen Reid & Priest LLP 2002 510000 
Thelen Reid & Priest LLP 2003 555000 
Wachtell Lipton  Rosen & Katz   1993 1350000 
Wachtell Lipton  Rosen & Katz   1994 1400000 
Wachtell Lipton  Rosen & Katz   1995 1595000 
Wachtell Lipton  Rosen & Katz   1996 1390000 
Wachtell Lipton  Rosen & Katz   1997 2200000 
Wachtell Lipton  Rosen & Katz   1998 3105000 
Wachtell Lipton  Rosen & Katz   1999 3385000 
Wachtell Lipton  Rosen & Katz   2000 3285000 
Wachtell Lipton  Rosen & Katz   2001 3165000 
Wachtell Lipton  Rosen & Katz   2002 2920000 
Wachtell Lipton  Rosen & Katz   2003 2585000 
Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP 1993 745000 
Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP 1994 700000 
(Continued on next page) 
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Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP 1995 705000 
Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP 1996 735000 
Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP 1997 805000 
Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP 1998 890000 
Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP 1999 980000 
Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP 2000 1025000 
Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP 2001 1130000 
Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP 2002 1300000 
Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP 2003 1505000 
White & Case LLP 1993 530000 
White & Case LLP 1994 555000 
White & Case LLP 1995 565000 
White & Case LLP 1996 565000 
White & Case LLP 1997 625000 
White & Case LLP 1998 665000 
White & Case LLP 1999 725000 
White & Case LLP 2000 775000 
White & Case LLP 2001 865000 
White & Case LLP 2002 935000 
White & Case LLP 2003 1010000 
Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP 1993 720000 
Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP 1994 740000 
Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP 1995 760000 
Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP 1996 915000 
Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP 1997 900000 
Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP 1998 955000 
Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP 1999 1100000 
Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP 2000 1015000 
Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP 2001 1170000 
Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP 2002 1295000 
Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP 2003 1410000 
Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz, Edelman & Dicker LLP 1993 405000 
Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz, Edelman & Dicker LLP 1994 275000 
Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz, Edelman & Dicker LLP 1995 320000 
Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz, Edelman & Dicker LLP 1996 330000 
Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz, Edelman & Dicker LLP 1997 305000 
Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz, Edelman & Dicker LLP 1998 290000 
Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz, Edelman & Dicker LLP 1999 270000 
Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz, Edelman & Dicker LLP 2000 270000 
Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz, Edelman & Dicker LLP 2001 370000 
Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz, Edelman & Dicker LLP 2002 605000 
Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz, Edelman & Dicker LLP 2003 690000 
APPENDIX E 
QUESTIONS FOR GP PARTNERS 
1. Has your firm discussed becoming an LLP? 
2. What were the reasons asserted in favor of remaining a GP? 
3. What were the reasons (other than limited liability) asserted in 
favor of LLP? 
4. Was there an age division? 
a. I.e., did older partners favor the status quo more than younger 
ones? 
5. Do you think that you’ll eventually move to become an LLP? 
6. Was there any talk of redoing the partnership agreement to re-
flect higher profits for high-risk/high-return partners if you moved to 
LLP? 
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7. Does your firm have a lock-step partner compensation struc-
ture? 
APPENDIX F 
QUESTIONS FOR LLP PARTNERS 
1. Your firm didn’t take advantage of the LLP statute right away.  
In fact it took you ___ years to make the LLP filing.  What took so long? 
OR 
Unlike many New York firms, your firm opted to become an LLP 
fairly quickly after the statute became effective.  Why was the choice so 
easy for you?  Why do you think other firms struggled with the decision 
and your firm did not? 
2. What were the primary arguments made against the LLP fil-
ing? 
a. Monitoring? 
b. Collegiality? 
c. Signaling? 
d. Intra-firm economics? 
e. Were there age differences in these arguments?  i.e. did older 
partners favor the traditional GP structure more than younger partners 
did? 
3. What were the factors that caused the arguments in favor of 
LLP to finally win out? 
4. Has your firm had any regrets about the choice to become an 
LLP? 
a. Has it altered your practice or relations with clients in any 
way?   
b. Has it altered relations among the partners in any way? 
c. Has it altered relations with your insurance company in any 
way? 
5. IF APPLICABLE—I notice that you filed at the same time as 
_____ [similar firms].  Was that a conscious decision?  Did their decision 
to file affect your decision in any way? 
6. Does your firm have a lock-step partnership structure? 
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